Bring script headers onto the template and close safeguard gaps

Headers claimed protections the code never had, and several destructive paths had no
guard against a collapsed config value.

Arrs_Stack/arr_cache_prefill.sh

@@ -30,6 +30,29 @@
 # An arr not configured on this host (e.g. Lidarr is HOST1-only) is skipped cleanly.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Warm the Cache, Never Own It
+#   This script only pre-populates what arr_get_tracked_data() would fetch on demand
+#   anyway. Nothing depends on it having run — every consumer still writes through on a
+#   cold cache. It removes latency and staleness, it is not a dependency.
+#
+# Failure Is a No-Op, Not an Error
+#   An arr that never comes up in time simply leaves its cache cold, exactly as if this
+#   script did not exist. That is why a missed prefill is logged rather than notified —
+#   the fallback path is the normal path.
+#
+# Wait Ceiling Matched to the Trigger
+#   The array-start run tolerates a long wait because containers are genuinely still
+#   starting. The 30-minute recurring run does not, because a live fetch takes seconds
+#   and a long wait there would only serve to overlap the next tick.
+#
+# Per-Arr Independence
+#   Each arr is prefilled on its own. One unconfigured or slow-starting arr never
+#   prevents the other two from being warmed.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #

Arrs_Stack/arr_corruption_scan.sh

@@ -62,6 +62,94 @@
 #           logged in Sonarr's history as "UserInvokedSearch").
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Detect Always, Act Only on Request
+#   A bare run probes and reports. Deleting a file the arr believes it has is a
+#   destructive act, so it requires --remediate explicitly. The scan can be scheduled
+#   weekly and read without any risk of it removing media on its own.
+#
+# One Probe Result Is Not Evidence
+#   ffprobe can fail for reasons that have nothing to do with the file — a mid-write
+#   import, an NFS blip, a container restart. Corruption must be observed
+#   CORRUPTION_SCAN_STRIKE_LIMIT times consecutively before remediation acts, and a
+#   single clean re-probe resets the counter.
+#
+# Skip-Cache Over Re-Probing
+#   At 90k+ tracked files a full re-probe every run is not viable. Files unchanged by
+#   mtime and size since they last verified clean are skipped, so each run spends its
+#   time on what actually changed rather than re-proving the library from scratch.
+#
+# Delete the Record, Let the Arr Re-Acquire
+#   Remediation removes the file record and explicitly triggers a search. The arr is
+#   left to obtain a good copy through its normal path — this script never tries to
+#   repair a file in place.
+#
+# Explicit Search, Not the Background Cycle
+#   The re-search is triggered directly rather than left to the arr's own missing-search
+#   cycle, because that cycle skips unmonitored items entirely and would silently leave
+#   an unmonitored corrupt file deleted and never replaced.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Root Enforcement
+#   docker exec into the ffprobe container requires root.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock prevents overlapping runs. Two instances would both probe and could
+#   both count a strike against the same file, reaching the limit in half the intended
+#   number of observations.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() aliases the arr URLs, API keys and HOST*_FFPROBE_CONTAINER.
+#
+# jq Dependency Check
+#   Fails fast if jq is missing — the tracked-file lists and every hasFile verification
+#   are parsed with it.
+#
+# Report-Only Default
+#   Nothing is deleted without --remediate.
+#
+# ffprobe Configuration Check
+#   Exits cleanly if FFPROBE_CONTAINER / FFPROBE_BIN are unconfigured for this host.
+#
+# ffprobe Container Health Check
+#   check_container_health() verifies the container is running and healthy before any
+#   probing. Every probe is a docker exec into it — if it is stopped or unhealthy every
+#   exec fails, every file reads as corrupt, and two consecutive runs would clear the
+#   strike limit and hand --remediate the whole library to delete.
+#
+# API Reachability + Version Gate
+#   check_api then check_arr_version per arr. A version mismatch skips that arr rather
+#   than issuing deletes against an API whose file-record endpoints may have moved.
+#
+# Per-Arr Isolation
+#   Sonarr and Radarr run sequentially, and one failing, unconfigured or version-
+#   mismatched arr never blocks the other.
+#
+# Unmapped Path Skip
+#   Files whose arr-side path cannot be mapped into the ffprobe container's mount
+#   namespace are skipped and counted, never probed through a wrong path and never
+#   treated as corrupt because the probe could not see them.
+#
+# Strike Threshold
+#   CORRUPTION_SCAN_STRIKE_LIMIT consecutive corrupt detections are required before
+#   --remediate deletes anything. A transient ffprobe failure cannot trigger a delete,
+#   and a clean re-probe clears the counter.
+#
+# Post-Delete Verification
+#   The DELETE response is never trusted. hasFile is re-checked and must have flipped
+#   false before the re-search is issued, so a failed delete never leaves the arr
+#   searching for something it still believes it has.
+#
+# Targeted Deletion
+#   Only the specific episodefile/moviefile record for the corrupt file is removed —
+#   never the series, movie, or any sibling file.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -174,6 +262,11 @@ if [[ -z "$FFPROBE_CONTAINER" || -z "$FFPROBE_BIN" ]]; then
     exit 0
 fi
 
+# Every probe is a docker exec into this container. If it is stopped or unhealthy, every
+# exec fails, every file reads as corrupt, and two such runs would clear the strike limit
+# and hand --remediate an entire library to delete. Abort before probing anything.
+check_container_health "$FFPROBE_CONTAINER" "${DOCKER_TIMEOUT:-30}" "Arr Corruption Scan"
+
 CORRUPTION_SCAN_STATE_FILE="${CORRUPTION_SCAN_STATE_FILE:-$DATA_DIR/corruption_scan_state.tsv}"
 mkdir -p "$(dirname "$CORRUPTION_SCAN_STATE_FILE")"
 touch "$CORRUPTION_SCAN_STATE_FILE"

Arrs_Stack/arr_download_orphan_cleaner.sh

@@ -39,7 +39,8 @@
 #                age gate an entry the arr cannot even name is not going to import: if the
 #                title is in the library and monitored, clearing it lets the arr search a
 #                copy it can actually parse; if it is not in the library, nothing is
-#                tracking it and it is dead weight either way. Guarded — see safeguard 6
+#                tracking it and it is dead weight either way. Guarded — see Non-Empty
+#                Library Requirement below
 #   HELD       — IMPORTABLE entries the arr keeps refusing (XEM-blocked, season-span
 #                files), and everything skipped by a guard → report only, human call
 #
@@ -47,27 +48,114 @@
 # there is no way to tell tracked from orphaned, and guessing means deleting active imports.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Classify Before Acting
+#   Every entry is placed in exactly one class before anything is deleted, and each class
+#   has its own justification. Nothing is removed because it merely looked unwanted — it is
+#   removed because it matched a category whose deletion rationale is written down above.
+#
+# The Queue Is the Source of Truth
+#   Tracked-vs-orphaned is decided by the arr's own queue, never inferred from filenames or
+#   timestamps. If the queue cannot be read, the arr is skipped entirely rather than
+#   falling back to a weaker signal — a guess here deletes an active import.
+#
+# Deleting Is Recoverable, Deleting Wrong Is Not
+#   The classes that get deleted are ones the arr can re-acquire: junk it could never
+#   import, content the library already has, and entries it cannot even name. Anything
+#   whose loss would be permanent or ambiguous is held and reported for a human instead.
+#
+# Abnormal Volume Means Broken Input
+#   The delete cap exists because the realistic failure mode is bad input, not bad logic —
+#   a partial queue fetch classifies live downloads as orphans, and the only visible
+#   symptom is an unusually large delete total. The cap turns that into a stop.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   1. DOWNLOAD_ORPHAN_CLEANER_ENABLED master toggle
-#   2. Download dir must exist and live under /mnt/ — refuses to walk anything else
-#   3. Queue fetch must succeed (see above)
-#   4. Age gate — nothing under DOWNLOAD_ORPHAN_AGE days is touched
-#   5. Deletion only for JUNK, parse-verified REDUNDANT, and UNMATCHED — never for
-#      IMPORTABLE or anything a guard has held
-#   6. UNMATCHED deletes require the arr to report a non-empty library. An empty or
-#      restoring database answers every parse with "no match", which would condemn the
-#      entire download dir; the library is queried directly rather than inferred from the
-#      run's own matches, since a small batch that is legitimately all-unmatched is normal
-#      once daily runs have caught up and would otherwise read as a broken database
-#   7. Run total over DOWNLOAD_ORPHAN_MAX_DELETE_GB aborts the delete pass and notifies —
-#      a queue fetch that returned partial data would classify live downloads as orphans,
-#      and an abnormally large delete total is the visible symptom of exactly that
-#      (--i-know-what-im-doing overrides, e.g. for a first run against a known backlog)
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Download folders are written by container users; removing them requires root.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock "wait" with an EXIT trap releasing all locks, so an interrupted run never
+#   strands a lock and the daily orchestrator is never silently skipped.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() runs before any HOST*_-prefixed download dir is resolved.
+#
+# DOWNLOAD_ORPHAN_CLEANER_ENABLED Toggle
+#   Master switch — exits cleanly when disabled.
+#
+# Download Path Restriction
+#   The download dir must exist and live under /mnt/. Anything else is refused rather
+#   than walked, so a blank or malformed path can never point the scan at the filesystem
+#   root or a system directory.
+#
+# Queue Fetch Hard Gate
+#   The arr is skipped entirely if its queue cannot be read. Without the queue there is no
+#   way to distinguish tracked from orphaned, and guessing deletes active imports.
+#
+# Age Gate
+#   Nothing under DOWNLOAD_ORPHAN_AGE days is touched, so an entry mid-import is never a
+#   deletion candidate regardless of how it classifies.
+#
+# Deletion Class Restriction
+#   Only JUNK, parse-verified REDUNDANT and UNMATCHED are deleted. IMPORTABLE entries and
+#   anything a guard has held are reported, never removed.
+#
+# Non-Empty Library Requirement
+#   UNMATCHED deletions require the arr to report a non-empty library. An empty or
+#   restoring database answers every parse with "no match", which would condemn the whole
+#   download dir. The library is queried directly rather than inferred from this run's own
+#   match rate — a small batch that is legitimately all-unmatched is normal once daily runs
+#   have caught up, and would otherwise read as a broken database.
+#
+# Delete Volume Cap
+#   A run total over DOWNLOAD_ORPHAN_MAX_DELETE_GB aborts the delete pass and notifies.
+#   --i-know-what-im-doing overrides it for a deliberate first run against a known backlog.
+#
+# Dry Run Support
+#   --dry-run classifies everything and reports, deleting and importing nothing.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
-# USAGE
+# CONFIGURATION
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# host*.conf (resolved per host after detect_hosts())
+#
+#   HOST*_SONARR_DOWNLOAD_DIR / HOST*_RADARR_DOWNLOAD_DIR
+#       Host-side path to the arr's completed-download folder. Absent means that arr's
+#       cleanup is skipped, not an error.
+#
+#   HOST*_SONARR_DOWNLOAD_CONTAINER_DIR / HOST*_RADARR_DOWNLOAD_CONTAINER_DIR
+#       The same folder as the arr container sees it — used when triggering the
+#       DownloadedEpisodesScan / DownloadedMoviesScan path.
+#
+#   SONARR_URL / SONARR_API_KEY / RADARR_URL / RADARR_API_KEY
+#       Aliased by detect_hosts(). A missing URL or key skips that arr.
+#
+# master.conf
+#
+#   DOWNLOAD_ORPHAN_CLEANER_ENABLED
+#       Master toggle (default: true)
+#
+#   DOWNLOAD_ORPHAN_AGE
+#       Days before an entry is eligible at all — younger entries may be mid-import
+#       (default: 7)
+#
+#   DOWNLOAD_ORPHAN_MIN_VIDEO_MB
+#       An entry with no video file above this size is JUNK (default: 50)
+#
+#   DOWNLOAD_ORPHAN_MAX_DELETE_GB
+#       Abort the delete pass if the run total exceeds this (default: 100)
+#
+#   SONARR_EXTENSIONS / RADARR_EXTENSIONS
+#       Video extensions used to decide whether an entry contains real media
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# RUNTIME MODES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
 #   arr_download_orphan_cleaner.sh                          — daily orchestrator entry

Arrs_Stack/arr_full_rescan.sh

@@ -20,22 +20,91 @@
 # and running them concurrently would just contend for the same disk I/O for no benefit.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Lidarr, then Sonarr, then Radarr — strictly sequential. Per arr:
+#
+#   1. Reachability
+#        → check_api; unreachable skips this arr only
+#
+#   2. Already-scanning check
+#        → a rescan already active (manual, or another script) means skip rather than
+#          stack a second full-disk walk on top of it
+#
+#   3. Capture the before count
+#        → tracked file count read from the arr's own stats
+#
+#   4. Trigger the rescan command
+#        → RescanFolders (Lidarr) / RescanSeries (Sonarr) / RescanMovie (Radarr)
+#
+#   5. Poll to completion
+#        → bounded by ARR_FULL_RESCAN_TIMEOUT
+#
+#   6. Report the delta
+#        → before vs after tracked count, so drift that was corrected is visible
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Proactive, Not Reactive
+#   check_tracked_count_floor() catches stat drift reactively, at the moment some other
+#   script is about to act on bad numbers. This job exists so that drift is corrected on a
+#   schedule instead of being discovered by whichever cleanup happens to trip over it first.
+#
+# Sequential by Design
+#   Each rescan is a full-disk walk. Running three concurrently contends for the same
+#   spindles and finishes no sooner, so the arrs are never parallelised — the slowness is
+#   accepted deliberately rather than optimised into I/O thrash.
+#
+# Never Stack a Scan
+#   An already-running rescan is left alone rather than duplicated. A second concurrent
+#   walk of the same library doubles the I/O cost and returns nothing the first will not.
+#
+# Per-Arr Isolation
+#   One arr being down, slow, or already scanning must never prevent the other two from
+#   being reconciled. Partial coverage beats a skipped run.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   Root required       — required for consistency across Arrs_Stack/, no direct fs writes here
-#   acquire_lock "wait" — waits for a prior run to finish rather than skipping or colliding;
-#                         a full-library rescan across three arrs can run long, worth queuing
-#                         behind rather than silently no-op'ing
-#   Reachability check  — check_api before touching an arr; unreachable → skip that arr only
-#   Active-rescan check — skips triggering a NEW rescan if one's already active on that arr
-#                         (manual trigger, another script) — never stacks a duplicate scan,
-#                         see Tools/arr_rescan_monitor.sh for catching up that arr's cache
-#                         once the pre-existing scan finishes instead of waiting for next week
-#   Sequential only     — never runs two arrs' rescans in parallel; each is a heavy full-disk
-#                         walk and concurrent walks would just contend for the same disk I/O
-#   Per-arr isolation   — one arr failing, timing out, or being skipped never blocks the others
-#   --dry-run mode      — reports which arrs would be rescanned, triggers nothing
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Kept for consistency across Arrs_Stack/ — this script makes no direct filesystem writes.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock "wait" — waits for a prior run rather than skipping or colliding. A full
+#   rescan across three arrs runs long and is worth queuing behind, not silently dropping.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() aliases each arr's URL and API key.
+#
+# jq Dependency Check
+#   Fails fast if jq is missing. Both the before/after tracked counts and the command
+#   payload are built with jq — without it the counts read empty and every delta would be
+#   reported as if nothing changed.
+#
+# Reachability Check
+#   check_api before touching an arr; unreachable skips that arr only.
+#
+# Active-Rescan Check
+#   Skips triggering a new rescan if one is already active on that arr, so a duplicate
+#   full-disk walk is never stacked. See Tools/arr_rescan_monitor.sh for catching that
+#   arr's cache up once the pre-existing scan finishes, rather than waiting a week.
+#
+# Sequential Only
+#   Two arrs' rescans never run in parallel.
+#
+# Per-Arr Isolation
+#   One arr failing, timing out, or being skipped never blocks the others.
+#
+# Timeout Bound
+#   ARR_FULL_RESCAN_TIMEOUT caps the wait per arr, so a rescan that never completes cannot
+#   hold the weekly window open indefinitely.
+#
+# Dry Run Support
+#   --dry-run reports which arrs would be rescanned and triggers nothing.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
@@ -72,6 +141,14 @@ if [[ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
     exit 1
 fi
 
+# Both the tracked-count reads and the command payload are built with jq — without it the
+# counts read empty and every arr would report a zero delta as if nothing had drifted.
+if ! command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    error "jq not found — required for JSON parsing"
+    notify "Arr full rescan failed on $(hostname) — jq not installed" "Arr Full Rescan" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
 acquire_lock "wait"
 
 detect_hosts

Arrs_Stack/lidarr_cleanup.sh

@@ -88,7 +88,6 @@
 #   jq + curl validation — exits if either tool missing
 #   ARR_DOCKER_TIMEOUT   — container checks protected against daemon hangs (script-local, not common.sh's DOCKER_TIMEOUT)
 #   Duplicate detection  — temp file of tracked paths, grep before delete
-#   platform_require_cmd  — notify script validated before use
 #   Silent by default    — orphans/junk warn(), clean library logs silently
 #
 # ==============================================================================================

Arrs_Stack/lidarr_duplicate_artist_cleanup.sh

@@ -52,6 +52,56 @@
 #   output. Only ambiguous (overlapping-album) pairs produce a notification.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Required by the container interaction and state writes.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock prevents overlapping runs racing on the same artist IDs.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() aliases LIDARR_URL / LIDARR_API_KEY.
+#
+# jq Dependency Check
+#   Fails fast if jq is missing — duplicate detection and every file-count read
+#   depend on it, and an absent jq would evaluate counts to empty and make every
+#   artist look like a zero-file phantom.
+#
+# API Reachability + Version Gate
+#   check_api then check_arr_version against LIDARR_VERSION_MAJOR before any read.
+#
+# Empty Library Abort
+#   A response of 0 artists aborts. An empty list is indistinguishable from
+#   "no duplicates" and must never be read as a clean result.
+#
+# Tracked-Count Floor
+#   check_tracked_count_floor against the baseline shared with lidarr_cleanup.sh.
+#   A library-wide desync — mid full-rescan, for example — makes trackFileCount read
+#   far below reality for many artists at once. Confirmed 2026-07-16: without this,
+#   both sides of a genuinely-real duplicate (ROMES) read as 0-file phantoms and the
+#   wrong one would have been deleted. Deliberately reuses lidarr_cleanup.sh's own
+#   baseline so every script depending on tracked counts shares one answer to "is
+#   Lidarr's data trustworthy right now" rather than forming a separate opinion.
+#
+# Files Never Deleted
+#   Removal passes deleteFiles=false. Only the phantom Lidarr entry is dropped;
+#   nothing on disk is touched, so a wrong call costs a re-add, not media.
+#
+# Phantom-Only Deletion
+#   Only the zero-file side of a duplicate pair is ever removed. If both sides hold
+#   files, or neither does unambiguously, the pair is flagged for manual review
+#   instead — the script never picks a winner between two real artists.
+#
+# Manual Review Reporting
+#   Flagged pairs are named in the summary and notification so an ambiguous
+#   duplicate surfaces as a decision to make rather than disappearing silently.
+#
+# Dry Run Support
+#   --dry-run reports every deletion and exclusion and performs none.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
 # ==============================================================================================
 #

Arrs_Stack/playback_aware_lidarr_discovery.sh

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 # Goal: 0–5 meaningful Lidarr adds per week, not bulk imports.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
-# FLOW
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
 #   1. Fetch play completions from Emby activity log (last LOOKBACK_DAYS days)
@@ -58,11 +58,26 @@
 #   Max adds:  LIDARR_DISCOVERY_MAX_ADDS (default 5) caps each stage
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
-# REQUIREMENTS
+# CONFIGURATION
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   Last.fm API key — required for both stages
-#   Configure HOST*_LASTFM_API_KEY in host*.conf
+# host*.conf (aliased by detect_hosts())
+#
+#   HOST*_LASTFM_API_KEY   Required for both stages — without it the run exits cleanly
+#                          rather than adding anything unscored.
+#   LIDARR_URL / LIDARR_API_KEY   Target arr
+#   EMBY_URL / EMBY_API_KEY       Play history source for seed selection
+#
+# master.conf
+#
+#   LIDARR_DISCOVERY_THRESHOLD          Score required to accept a candidate (0-100)
+#   LIDARR_DISCOVERY_LOOKBACK_DAYS      Emby play history window
+#   LIDARR_DISCOVERY_MIN_PLAYS          Min plays in the window before an artist is evaluated
+#   LIDARR_DISCOVERY_USER_CAP_PCT       Max % of the play score any one user can contribute,
+#                                       so a single heavy listener cannot drive the library
+#   LIDARR_DISCOVERY_MAX_ADDS           Hard cap on artists added per run
+#   LIDARR_DISCOVERY_REJECT_COOLDOWN    Days before a rejected artist is re-evaluated
+#   LIDARR_DISCOVERY_HISTORY            Decision history DB — accepted and rejected
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES

Arrs_Stack/playback_aware_radarr_discovery.sh

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 # Goal: 0–5 meaningful Radarr adds per run, not bulk imports.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
-# FLOW
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
 #   1. Fetch recently watched movies from Emby (SEED_LIBRARIES, last LOOKBACK_DAYS days)
@@ -56,12 +56,28 @@
 #   Max adds:  RADARR_DISCOVERY_MAX_ADDS (default 5)
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
-# REQUIREMENTS
+# CONFIGURATION
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   TMDB API key — required for Stage 2 recommendations
-#   Configure HOST*_TMDB_API_KEY in host*.conf
-#   Free key at: https://www.themoviedb.org/settings/api
+# host*.conf (aliased by detect_hosts())
+#
+#   HOST*_TMDB_API_KEY   Required for Stage 2 recommendations. Free key at
+#                        https://www.themoviedb.org/settings/api — without it the run
+#                        exits cleanly rather than adding anything unscored.
+#   RADARR_URL / RADARR_API_KEY   Target arr
+#   EMBY_URL / EMBY_API_KEY       Play history source for seed selection
+#
+# master.conf
+#
+#   RADARR_DISCOVERY_THRESHOLD          Score required to accept a candidate (0-100)
+#   RADARR_DISCOVERY_LOOKBACK_DAYS      Emby watch history window
+#   RADARR_DISCOVERY_MAX_SEEDS          Max seed movies taken from Stage 1
+#   RADARR_DISCOVERY_MAX_ADDS           Hard cap on movies added per run
+#   RADARR_DISCOVERY_MIN_VOTE_COUNT     Min TMDB votes for a candidate to be considered
+#   RADARR_DISCOVERY_MIN_RATING         Min TMDB vote_average × 10
+#   RADARR_DISCOVERY_REJECT_COOLDOWN    Days before a rejected movie is re-evaluated
+#   RADARR_DISCOVERY_SEED_LIBRARIES     Emby libraries to draw seed movies from
+#   RADARR_DISCOVERY_HISTORY            Decision history DB — accepted and rejected
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES

Arrs_Stack/playback_aware_sonarr_discovery.sh

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 # Goal: 0–3 meaningful Sonarr adds per run, not bulk imports.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
-# FLOW
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
 #   1. Fetch all Series from Emby SONARR_EMBY_LIBRARIES — build TMDB+TVDB index
@@ -63,12 +63,29 @@
 #   Max adds:  SONARR_DISCOVERY_MAX_ADDS (default 3) — TV is a larger commitment than movies
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
-# REQUIREMENTS
+# CONFIGURATION
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   TMDB API key — required for Stage 2 recommendations and external_ids lookup
-#   Configure HOST*_TMDB_API_KEY in host*.conf
-#   Free key at: https://www.themoviedb.org/settings/api
+# host*.conf (aliased by detect_hosts())
+#
+#   HOST*_TMDB_API_KEY   Required for Stage 2 recommendations and external_ids lookup.
+#                        Free key at https://www.themoviedb.org/settings/api — without it
+#                        the run exits cleanly rather than adding anything unscored.
+#   SONARR_URL / SONARR_API_KEY   Target arr
+#   EMBY_URL / EMBY_API_KEY       Play history source for seed selection
+#
+# master.conf
+#
+#   SONARR_DISCOVERY_THRESHOLD          Score required to accept a candidate (0-100)
+#   SONARR_DISCOVERY_LOOKBACK_DAYS      Emby episode play history window
+#   SONARR_DISCOVERY_MAX_SEEDS          Max seed series taken from Stage 1
+#   SONARR_DISCOVERY_MAX_ADDS           Hard cap on shows added per run
+#   SONARR_DISCOVERY_MIN_VOTE_COUNT     Min TMDB votes for a candidate to be considered
+#   SONARR_DISCOVERY_MIN_RATING         Min TMDB vote_average × 10
+#   SONARR_DISCOVERY_REJECT_COOLDOWN    Days before a rejected show is re-evaluated
+#   SONARR_DISCOVERY_USER_EPISODE_CAP   Max episodes one user contributes to seed volume
+#   SONARR_DISCOVERY_MONITOR_MODE       Sonarr monitor mode on add
+#   SONARR_DISCOVERY_HISTORY            Decision history DB — accepted and rejected
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES

Arrs_Stack/radarr_classification_scan.sh

@@ -15,8 +15,11 @@
 #   FORWARD  — a movie classified as anime/kids is sitting outside its dedicated root
 #   REVERSE  — a movie sitting inside the kids/anime root doesn't match that classification
 #
-# Report-only. No files are moved and no Radarr API writes happen — this is a detection
-# tool. Every rule below was validated against this library's real data before being
+# Report-only by default — no files are moved and no Radarr API writes happen unless a
+# mode flag is given. Pass --move to relocate forward misplacements, or --remove-junk to
+# delete and import-exclude bad-metadata entries (see OPERATIONAL MODEL below); without
+# those flags this is purely a detection tool. Every rule below was validated against
+# this library's real data before being
 # adopted (see master.conf comments above the curated lists) — this is not a generic
 # genre-matcher, it's tuned specifically against the false-positive traps that showed up
 # when testing looser rules (documented per-rule below).
@@ -52,13 +55,38 @@
 #   blocklist and likely nothing legitimate to redownload under that exact TMDb match.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Report pass (always):
+#   check_api → check_arr_version → arr_get_tracked_data (cache-first, one call)
+#   → classify every movie → report FORWARD, REVERSE and JUNK findings
+#
+# Remove-junk pass (--remove-junk, runs first when combined with --move):
+#   One entry at a time, halting on the first failure.
+#   DELETE with deleteFiles=false and addImportExclusion=true — the Radarr entry is
+#   removed and blocked from re-adding, files on disk are never touched. is_junk
+#   requires hasFile == false, so there is no file behind these entries anyway.
+#   Verified by re-fetching and requiring a 404 before counting as removed.
+#
+# Move pass (--move):
+#   One movie at a time, verified after each.
+#   hasFile == true  → moveFiles=true, then poll the async MoveMovie command to
+#                      "completed" (bounded by RADARR_MOVE_POLL_TIMEOUT) before the
+#                      DB-field check — the DB flips instantly while the physical
+#                      move is still queued.
+#   hasFile == false → correct rootFolderPath/path and trigger MoviesSearch instead;
+#                      there is nothing to move.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-# Report, Don't Act
-#   This script never calls Radarr's write API and never touches a file. Every finding is
-#   a candidate for a human decision — moving media and re-pointing Radarr's tracking is a
-#   separate, deliberate follow-up action, not something this scan does automatically.
+# Report by Default, Act Only on Request
+#   A bare run never calls Radarr's write API and never touches a file — every finding is
+#   just a candidate. Acting on them requires an explicit --move or --remove-junk flag, so
+#   the scan can be scheduled and re-run freely while the curated lists are being tuned
+#   without any risk of it rearranging the library on its own.
 #
 # Curated Lists, Not Bare Genre/Cert Matching
 #   Every signal used here failed at least once as a bare/standalone check during rule
@@ -72,6 +100,71 @@
 #   if the shared cache is warm) regardless of library size.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Required by the container interaction and state writes.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock, plus acquire_lock "wait" around the write passes with an EXIT trap
+#   releasing all locks, so an interrupted run never leaves a lock behind.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() aliases RADARR_URL / RADARR_API_KEY / the root literals.
+#
+# curl + jq Dependency Check
+#   Fails fast if either is missing — every classification signal is parsed with jq.
+#
+# Report-Only Default
+#   No write happens without --move or --remove-junk.
+#
+# Required Var Check
+#   require_var on RADARR_URL and RADARR_API_KEY before any request.
+#
+# API Reachability + Version Gate
+#   check_api then check_arr_version against RADARR_VERSION_MAJOR. A major version bump
+#   can move or rename the fields every rule depends on, so a mismatch aborts rather
+#   than classifying against an unknown schema.
+#
+# Empty Library Abort
+#   A response of 0 movies aborts — an empty list is indistinguishable from a clean
+#   library and would otherwise report success during an API fault.
+#
+# Unconfigured Root Skip
+#   A blank kids/anime root skips that category's checks rather than comparing paths
+#   against an empty string.
+#
+# Files Never Deleted
+#   Junk removal passes deleteFiles=false. Only the Radarr entry is removed, and
+#   addImportExclusion=true stops it being re-added. is_junk additionally requires
+#   hasFile == false, so these entries have nothing on disk in the first place.
+#
+# One At A Time, Stop On First Failure
+#   Both write passes process one entry at a time and halt on the first failure rather
+#   than continuing through the library.
+#
+# Post-Write Verification
+#   Removal is confirmed by re-fetching and requiring a 404. Moves are confirmed by
+#   re-fetching and checking rootFolderPath and hasFile. The API response alone is
+#   never treated as proof.
+#
+# Async Move Completion Polling
+#   moveFiles=true flips the DB instantly while the physical move is a separate async
+#   MoveMovie command. Each move polls its own command to "completed" (bounded by
+#   RADARR_MOVE_POLL_TIMEOUT) before the DB-field check, so a batch cannot report
+#   everything moved while files are still queued at the old path.
+#
+# Junk Vote Threshold
+#   RADARR_JUNK_MIN_VOTES gates junk detection alongside hasFile == false and a null
+#   imdbId. All three must hold — a thin-metadata entry that actually has a file, or
+#   has an IMDb ID, is never treated as junk.
+#
+# Post-Write Cache Refresh
+#   The tracked-data cache is refreshed after writes so no other arr script reads a
+#   stale rootFolderPath or a movie that no longer exists.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
 # ==============================================================================================
 #

Arrs_Stack/radarr_cleanup.sh

@@ -98,7 +98,6 @@
 #   jq + curl validation — exits if either tool missing
 #   ARR_DOCKER_TIMEOUT   — container checks protected against daemon hangs (script-local, not common.sh's DOCKER_TIMEOUT)
 #   notify_emby_scan()   — triggers Emby clean after deletion
-#   platform_require_cmd  — notify script validated before use
 #   Silent by default    — orphans/junk warn(), clean library logs silently
 #
 # ==============================================================================================

Arrs_Stack/sonarr_classification_scan.sh

@@ -61,9 +61,15 @@
 # no Sonarr equivalent for the same reason.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
-# MOVE MODE (--move)
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
+# Report pass (always):
+#   check_api → check_arr_version → arr_get_tracked_data (cache-first, one call)
+#   → classify every series → report FORWARD and REVERSE disagreements → exit
+#
+# Move pass (--move only), described in detail below:
+#
 # Acts on FORWARD misplacements (classified anime/kids, sitting in the wrong root) and on
 # REVERSE-KIDS leaks (adult certification sitting in the kids root — moved back to
 # SONARR_GENERAL_ROOT). Does NOT act on REVERSE-ANIME leaks — those are genuine judgment
@@ -93,6 +99,70 @@
 #   of library size. Refreshed after --move writes so no other script reads stale data.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Required by the container interaction and state writes.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock prevents a scheduled run overlapping a manual --move.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() aliases SONARR_URL / SONARR_API_KEY / the root literals.
+#
+# curl + jq Dependency Check
+#   Fails fast if either is missing — every classification signal is parsed with jq,
+#   and a missing jq would evaluate each signal to empty and classify nothing.
+#
+# Report-Only Default
+#   Nothing is written to Sonarr without --move. The scan is safe to schedule and
+#   safe to run repeatedly while tuning the curated lists.
+#
+# Required Var Check
+#   require_var on SONARR_URL and SONARR_API_KEY before any request.
+#
+# API Reachability + Version Gate
+#   check_api then check_arr_version against SONARR_VERSION_MAJOR. A major version
+#   bump can move or rename the fields every rule here depends on, so a mismatch
+#   aborts rather than classifying against an unknown schema.
+#
+# Empty Library Abort
+#   A response of 0 series aborts. An empty list is indistinguishable from "nothing
+#   is misplaced" and would otherwise report a clean library during an API fault.
+#
+# Unconfigured Root Skip
+#   A blank SONARR_GENERAL_ROOT / KIDS_ROOT / ANIME_ROOT skips that category's
+#   checks rather than erroring — a host with no dedicated root is a valid setup,
+#   and a blank value must never be compared against as if it were a real path.
+#
+# One At A Time, Stop On First Failure
+#   Series are moved individually and the batch halts on the first failure rather
+#   than continuing. A misclassified root or a failing move is a condition to
+#   review, not to repeat across the library.
+#
+# Async Move Completion Polling
+#   moveFiles=true flips the DB instantly while the physical move is a separate
+#   async MoveSeries command Sonarr drains one at a time. Each move locates its own
+#   command and polls it to "completed" (bounded by SONARR_MOVE_POLL_TIMEOUT) before
+#   anything else is checked. Without this a batch reports every series moved while
+#   the files are still queued at the old path — and downstream orphan cleanup can
+#   act on that gap.
+#
+# Post-Move Re-Verification
+#   The PUT response is never trusted. The series is re-fetched and both
+#   rootFolderPath and episodeFileCount are confirmed against expectations before
+#   the move counts as successful.
+#
+# Reverse-Anime Leaks Excluded From Moves
+#   Deliberate style placements (Western/Chinese animation grouped with anime by
+#   choice) legitimately sit in the anime root. Those are reported, never moved.
+#
+# Post-Write Cache Refresh
+#   The tracked-data cache is refreshed after --move writes so no other arr script
+#   reads a stale rootFolderPath.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
 # ==============================================================================================
 #

Arrs_Stack/sonarr_cleanup.sh

@@ -92,7 +92,6 @@
 #   jq + curl validation — exits if either tool missing
 #   ARR_DOCKER_TIMEOUT   — container checks protected against daemon hangs (script-local, not common.sh's DOCKER_TIMEOUT)
 #   notify_emby_scan()   — triggers Emby clean after deletion
-#   platform_require_cmd  — notify script validated before use
 #   Silent by default    — orphans/junk warn(), clean library logs silently
 #
 # ==============================================================================================

Arrs_Stack/start_webhook_listener.sh

@@ -67,13 +67,38 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   WEBHOOK_PORT=0 gate  — exits cleanly before any setup if the listener is disabled
-#   acquire_lock "continuous" — exits 0 cleanly if a healthy instance is already running,
-#                          instead of relaunching into a port conflict
-#   Secret auto-generate — WEBHOOK_SECRET generated via openssl rand if empty;
-#                          persisted to master.conf immediately so restarts reuse it
-#   Shared secret gate   — webhook URL must include ?key=<WEBHOOK_SECRET>;
-#                          requests without a valid key are rejected by the Node.js server
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Writes /var/log/varaverk and persists the generated secret into master.conf.
+#
+# WEBHOOK_PORT=0 Gate
+#   Exits cleanly before any setup if the listener is disabled.
+#
+# node Presence Check
+#   node is exec'd at the end of this script. Checking up front fails with a clear
+#   reason at array start rather than an exec error buried in the log after setup.
+#
+# openssl Presence Check
+#   Checked before attempting to generate a secret, on the path that needs it.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock "continuous" exits 0 cleanly if a healthy instance is already
+#   listening, instead of relaunching into an EADDRINUSE port conflict. An array
+#   stop/start without a full reboot leaves the old node process alive, and without
+#   this array_started.sh would log a false failure.
+#
+# Secret Auto-Generation
+#   WEBHOOK_SECRET generated via openssl rand if empty, and persisted to master.conf
+#   so restarts reuse it.
+#
+# Secret Persistence Verification
+#   The write-back is confirmed by re-reading master.conf. If it did not land, the
+#   secret would exist only in this process and be regenerated on the next start,
+#   silently invalidating the key already registered in the arrs — so this aborts
+#   loudly rather than starting with a secret that will not survive a restart.
+#
+# Shared Secret Gate
+#   The webhook URL must include ?key=<WEBHOOK_SECRET>; requests without a valid key
+#   are rejected by the Node.js server.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
@@ -104,11 +129,25 @@ ECOSYSTEM_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
 
 source "$ECOSYSTEM_ROOT/load_config.sh"
 
+if [[ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
+    error "Must be run as root"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
 [[ "${WEBHOOK_PORT:-0}" -eq 0 ]] && {
     echo "[webhook] WEBHOOK_PORT=0 — listener disabled"
     exit 0
 }
 
+# node is exec'd at the end of this script — checking here fails with a clear reason at
+# array start instead of an exec error buried in the log after all the setup has run.
+if ! command -v node >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    error "node not found — required to run webhook_listener.js"
+    notify "Webhook listener failed to start on $(hostname) — node not installed" \
+        "Webhook Listener" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
 # Skip gracefully if a healthy instance is already listening — otherwise a
 # restart that doesn't kill the old node process (array stop/start without a
 # full reboot) hits EADDRINUSE and array_started.sh logs a false failure.
@@ -116,10 +155,29 @@ acquire_lock "continuous"
 
 # ── Auto-generate secret if not yet set ─────────────────────────────────────
 if [[ -z "${WEBHOOK_SECRET:-}" ]]; then
+    if ! command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        error "openssl not found — cannot generate WEBHOOK_SECRET"
+        notify "Webhook listener failed to start on $(hostname) — openssl not installed" \
+            "Webhook Listener" "warning"
+        exit 1
+    fi
+
     GENERATED=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
     MASTER_CONF="$ECOSYSTEM_ROOT/Configurations/master.conf"
     sed -i "s/WEBHOOK_SECRET=\"\"/WEBHOOK_SECRET=\"$GENERATED\"/" "$MASTER_CONF"
     WEBHOOK_SECRET="$GENERATED"
+
+    # If the sed didn't match, the secret only exists in this process. The listener would
+    # come up, then regenerate a different secret on the next start — silently invalidating
+    # the key already registered in the arrs. Fail loudly instead.
+    if ! grep -q "WEBHOOK_SECRET=\"$GENERATED\"" "$MASTER_CONF" 2>/dev/null; then
+        error "Generated WEBHOOK_SECRET but could not persist it to $MASTER_CONF"
+        error "Set WEBHOOK_SECRET manually — a non-persisted secret changes on every restart"
+        notify "Webhook secret not persisted on $(hostname) — set WEBHOOK_SECRET manually" \
+            "Webhook Listener" "warning"
+        exit 1
+    fi
+
     echo "[webhook] Generated WEBHOOK_SECRET — run Tools/webhook_setup.sh to register in arrs"
 fi
 

Arrs_Stack/upgrade_webhook_handler.sh

@@ -15,6 +15,30 @@
 # begin searching — a search it will never win because we already have it.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Invoked per import by webhook_listener.js with <arr_type> <item_path>:
+#
+#   1. Validate
+#        → arr_type must be sonarr|radarr|lidarr; item_path must exist and be a safe
+#          absolute path
+#
+#   2. Resolve arr specifics
+#        → API port, API version and rescan command for that arr type
+#
+#   3. Discover remote nodes
+#        → discover_remote_nodes(); no remotes configured means exit cleanly
+#
+#   4. Per remote node, independently:
+#        a. Resolve its Tailscale IP — unresolvable skips that node
+#        b. rsync the single item to the same absolute path (--no-delete)
+#        c. Skip the rescan if rsync failed — never scan a partial file
+#        d. Trigger the arr's refresh command, cache-first API key with SSH fallback
+#
+# One failing node is counted and skipped; the rest still receive the upgrade.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -38,13 +62,47 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   Arg validation      — exits with usage message if arr_type or item_path missing
-#   Path existence      — exits if item_path is not a directory on disk
-#   Tailscale resolution — skips a node if its Tailscale IP cannot be resolved
-#   rsync exit check    — rescan is only triggered if rsync succeeded; a failed
-#                         transfer does not cause the remote arr to scan a partial file
-#   SSH fallback        — if no cached API key, falls back to SSH to read config.xml
-#                         on the remote rather than failing the rescan step
+# Root Enforcement
+#   rsync runs over SSH as root and writes to root@remote at the same absolute path.
+#
+# Argument Validation
+#   Exits with a usage message if arr_type or item_path is missing, and rejects an
+#   arr_type outside sonarr|radarr|lidarr rather than defaulting to one.
+#
+# Path Existence
+#   Exits if item_path is not a directory on disk.
+#
+# Item Path Depth Guard
+#   item_path must be an absolute path at least three levels deep. It arrives from the
+#   arr's webhook payload and is rsynced to the same path on the partner, so a truncated
+#   or malformed value would push a system directory — or the filesystem root — onto the
+#   remote. The existence check alone does not catch this, because / is a directory.
+#
+# No Lock — Deliberate
+#   This is an event handler invoked per import by webhook_listener.js. Concurrent
+#   upgrades are normal and expected. A default lock would silently drop overlapping
+#   events, and a waiting lock would queue them behind a slow transfer, so neither is
+#   used: each invocation rsyncs a different item path and they do not contend.
+#
+# Tailscale Resolution
+#   Skips a node if its Tailscale IP cannot be resolved, rather than attempting the
+#   transfer against an unresolved or stale address.
+#
+# rsync Exit Check
+#   The rescan is only triggered if rsync succeeded. A failed transfer never causes the
+#   remote arr to scan a partial file into its library.
+#
+# No Delete on Push
+#   rsync runs with --no-delete. This pushes one upgraded item; it is not a mirror, and
+#   must never remove content on the partner that this run does not know about.
+#
+# SSH Fallback
+#   If no cached API key is available, falls back to SSH to read config.xml on the
+#   remote rather than failing the rescan step.
+#
+# Per-Node Isolation
+#   One unreachable or failing node is counted and skipped; the remaining nodes still
+#   receive the upgrade.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
@@ -90,6 +148,21 @@ ITEM_PATH="${2:-}"
 
 [[ -d "$ITEM_PATH" ]] || { echo "Path not found: $ITEM_PATH" >&2; exit 1; }
 
+if [[ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
+    echo "Must be run as root" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+# ITEM_PATH is rsynced to root@remote at the same absolute path. It arrives from the arr's
+# webhook payload, so a malformed or truncated value would push a system directory — or the
+# filesystem root — onto the partner. -d alone does not catch that: / is a directory.
+_depth="${ITEM_PATH//[^\/]/}"
+if [[ "$ITEM_PATH" != /* || "${#_depth}" -lt 3 ]]; then
+    echo "Refusing unsafe item path: '$ITEM_PATH' — expected an absolute path at least 3 levels deep" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+unset _depth
+
 SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../load_config.sh"
 detect_hosts

Docker_Essentials/docker_container_stop.sh

@@ -68,6 +68,15 @@
 # Docker Presence Check
 #   Verifies docker binary exists before execution.
 #
+# Docker Daemon Check
+#   Verifies the daemon is responsive before enumerating containers. A hung
+#   daemon returns an empty container list, which would otherwise be read as
+#   "nothing to stop" and pass a shutdown that never happened.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() identifies which server is running the script and sets
+#   MY_ID / LOCAL_SERVER_NAME for logging and notifications.
+#
 # Lock Acquisition
 #   acquire_lock prevents overlapping runs (e.g. array_stopping firing twice).
 #
@@ -140,10 +149,20 @@ fi
 
 detect_hosts
 
-[[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]] && warn "DRY RUN — no containers will be stopped"
-
 DOCKER_TIMEOUT=30
 DOCKER_STOP_TIMEOUT=30    # grace period for SIGTERM before docker sends SIGKILL internally
+
+# A hung daemon makes docker ps return nothing — indistinguishable from "no containers
+# running", which would silently report a clean shutdown that never happened.
+if ! timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    error "Docker daemon not responding — cannot verify container shutdown"
+    notify "Container stop aborted on $(hostname) ($MY_ID) — Docker daemon not responding" \
+        "Docker Container Stop" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+[[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]] && warn "DRY RUN — no containers will be stopped"
+
 _RETRY_COUNT="${RETRY_COUNT:-3}"
 
 log "$ICON_GEAR Config: retries=$_RETRY_COUNT sleep=${SLEEP:-5}s grace=${DOCKER_STOP_TIMEOUT}s cmd-timeout=${DOCKER_TIMEOUT}s"
@@ -152,7 +171,7 @@ log "$ICON_GEAR Config: retries=$_RETRY_COUNT sleep=${SLEEP:-5}s grace=${DOCKER_
 # ━━━ Status ━━━
 # ==============================================================================================
 if [[ "$SHOW_STATUS" == true ]]; then
-    mapfile -t RUNNING < <(docker ps --format '{{.Names}}' 2>/dev/null | sort)
+    mapfile -t RUNNING < <(timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker ps --format '{{.Names}}' 2>/dev/null | sort)
     echo ""
     echo "━━━━━ $ICON_SUMMARY STATUS ━━━━━"
     echo "$ICON_HOST       Identity:  $MY_ID ($LOCAL_SERVER_NAME)"
@@ -166,7 +185,7 @@ fi
 # ==============================================================================================
 # ━━━ Stop Containers ━━━
 # ==============================================================================================
-mapfile -t RUNNING < <(docker ps --format '{{.Names}}' 2>/dev/null | sort)
+mapfile -t RUNNING < <(timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker ps --format '{{.Names}}' 2>/dev/null | sort)
 
 echo ""
 echo "━━━ $ICON_CONTAINERS Docker Container Stop — $(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S') ━━━"
@@ -187,7 +206,7 @@ FAILED=()
 for container in "${RUNNING[@]}"; do
     [[ -z "$container" ]] && continue
     c_start=$(date +%s)
-    c_image=$(docker inspect --format '{{.Config.Image}}' "$container" 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")
+    c_image=$(timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker inspect --format '{{.Config.Image}}' "$container" 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")
     log "━━━ $ICON_CONTAINERS $container ($c_image) ━━━"
 
     if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]]; then

Docker_Essentials/docker_daily_restart.sh

@@ -14,6 +14,33 @@
 # so there is no second list to maintain.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Containers are processed one at a time in dependency-safe order:
+#
+#   1. Build restart order
+#        → build_restart_order() sorts DAILY_RESTART_CONTAINERS by WATCHDOG_DEPENDENCIES
+#
+#   2. Skip anything docker_update.sh already rebuilt this run
+#        → a rebuild onto a new image already restarted it moments ago
+#
+#   3. Inspect container state
+#        missing  → skip, not an error
+#        stopped  → skip, stopped state is respected
+#        running  → restart
+#
+#   4. Restart with retry
+#        → retry_docker wraps each attempt in a timeout, up to RETRY_COUNT
+#
+#   5. Verify it stayed running
+#        → verify_running() settles for RESTART_VERIFY_WAIT then checks State.Running
+#        → a container that crashes immediately is marked failed and notified
+#
+#   6. Prune dangling images
+#        → restarts swap onto new images, leaving the old ones dangling
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -37,6 +64,27 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Docker operations require root privileges.
+#
+# Docker Presence Check
+#   Verifies the docker binary exists before execution. Notifies on absence —
+#   a missing binary during the maintenance window is worth knowing about.
+#
+# Docker Daemon Check
+#   Verifies the daemon is responsive before any restart work. Every container
+#   would otherwise fail its inspect and be logged as an unknown-status failure,
+#   burying one daemon fault under a list of bogus per-container errors.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() identifies which server is running the script and aliases
+#   HOST*_DAILY_RESTART_CONTAINERS and HOST*_WATCHDOG_DEPENDENCIES to the
+#   correct host's values.
+#
+# Empty List Guard
+#   Exits cleanly with a pointer to the relevant conf key if
+#   DAILY_RESTART_CONTAINERS is unconfigured for this host.
+#
 # Dependency Ordering
 #   Containers restart in dependency-safe order using HOST*_WATCHDOG_DEPENDENCIES.
 #   CONTAINER_DELAY seconds between dependency restart and dependent restart gives
@@ -53,6 +101,11 @@
 #   cannot cause this script to hang indefinitely. Timed-out commands retry
 #   per RETRY_COUNT before marking as failed.
 #
+# Stale Rebuild-List Guard
+#   The rebuilt-container list written by docker_update.sh is discarded if older
+#   than DOCKER_UPDATE_REBUILT_STALE_HOURS. A stale file would otherwise suppress
+#   real restarts based on an update run that never happened today.
+#
 # Lock Acquisition
 #   acquire_lock() prevents concurrent execution if a previous run is still active.
 #
@@ -134,6 +187,14 @@ fi
 # detect_hosts() sets MY_ID and aliases HOST*_DAILY_RESTART_CONTAINERS → DAILY_RESTART_CONTAINERS
 detect_hosts
 
+# Without this, a hung daemon fails every container's inspect individually and the summary
+# reports a list of unknown-status failures instead of the one fault that caused them.
+if ! timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    error "Docker daemon not responding — skipping daily restart"
+    notify "Daily restart skipped on $(hostname) — Docker daemon not responding" "Docker Daily Restart" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
 if [[ ${#DAILY_RESTART_CONTAINERS[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
     warn "DAILY_RESTART_CONTAINERS is empty for $MY_ID — nothing to restart"
     warn "Check HOST${MY_ID#HOST}_DAILY_RESTART_CONTAINERS in host*.conf"
@@ -213,7 +274,7 @@ LAST_RESTARTED=""
 for container in "${ORDERED_RESTART[@]}"; do
     [[ -z "$container" ]] && continue
     c_start=$(date +%s)
-    c_image=$(docker inspect --format '{{.Config.Image}}' "$container" 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")
+    c_image=$(timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker inspect --format '{{.Config.Image}}' "$container" 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")
     log "━━━ $ICON_CONTAINERS $container ($c_image) ━━━"
 
     if ! timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker inspect "$container" &>/dev/null; then
@@ -242,7 +303,6 @@ for container in "${ORDERED_RESTART[@]}"; do
                 RESTARTED+=("$container")
             else
                 if retry_docker docker restart "$container"; then
-                    [[ "${RESTART_VERIFY_WAIT:-3}" -gt 0 ]] && sleep "${RESTART_VERIFY_WAIT:-3}"
                     if verify_running "$container"; then
                         echo "$ICON_STARTED $container restarted and running in $(format_duration $(( $(date +%s) - c_start ))) ✅"
                         RESTARTED+=("$container")
@@ -283,7 +343,7 @@ if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]]; then
     warn "DRY RUN — would prune dangling images"
     PRUNED_SUMMARY="(dry run)"
 else
-    PRUNED_OUTPUT=$(docker image prune -f 2>&1)
+    PRUNED_OUTPUT=$(timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker image prune -f 2>&1)
     [[ "$ENABLE_LOGGING" == "true" ]] && echo "$PRUNED_OUTPUT" | sed 's/^/  /'
     PRUNED_SUMMARY=$(echo "$PRUNED_OUTPUT" | grep -E "^Total reclaimed" || echo "nothing reclaimed")
 fi

Docker_Essentials/docker_network_connect.sh

@@ -51,6 +51,12 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Docker network operations require root privileges.
+#
+# Docker Presence Check
+#   Verifies the docker binary exists before any network operations.
+#
 # Lock Acquisition
 #   Prevents concurrent execution via acquire_lock(). Safe to call from
 #   array start hooks or manually without risk of overlap.
@@ -71,8 +77,10 @@
 #   Warns and exits cleanly if NETWORK_CONNECT_NETWORKS or
 #   NETWORK_CONNECT_CONTAINERS are unconfigured.
 #
-# Command Validation
-#   Validates unRAID notify script before use.
+# Missing Container Tolerance
+#   A configured container that does not exist yet warns and is skipped rather
+#   than failing the run. This script executes early at array start, before
+#   every container has necessarily been created.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
@@ -130,13 +138,12 @@ fi
 # detect_hosts() sets MY_ID and aliases HOST*_NETWORK_CONNECT_* arrays
 detect_hosts
 
-# Validate unRAID notify script — used for network creation alerts
-
 # Docker daemon check — network operations are useless if daemon is hung
 DOCKER_TIMEOUT=15
 if ! timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; then
     error "Docker daemon not responding — cannot manage networks"
-    notify "docker_network_connect failed on $(hostname) — Docker daemon not responding"         "Network Connect" "warning"
+    notify "docker_network_connect failed on $(hostname) — Docker daemon not responding" \
+        "Network Connect" "warning"
     exit 1
 fi
 
@@ -291,7 +298,8 @@ if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]]; then
     warn "DRY RUN — no changes made"
 elif [[ ${#FAILED[@]} -gt 0 ]]; then
     echo "$ICON_ERROR Status: SOME OPERATIONS FAILED"
-    notify "Docker network connect failed on $(hostname) — ${FAILED[*]}"         "Network Connect" "warning"
+    notify "Docker network connect failed on $(hostname) — ${FAILED[*]}" \
+        "Network Connect" "warning"
 elif [[ ${#NETWORKS_CREATED[@]} -gt 0 ]]; then
     warn "Networks recreated — ${NETWORKS_CREATED[*]} — unRAID update likely wiped them"
 else

Docker_Essentials/docker_update.sh

@@ -74,6 +74,28 @@
 # Root Enforcement
 #   Docker operations require root privileges.
 #
+# Docker Presence Check
+#   Verifies the docker binary exists before execution.
+#
+# Docker Daemon Check
+#   Verifies the daemon is responsive before container discovery. Remainder mode
+#   derives its entire target list from docker ps — against a hung daemon that
+#   returns empty and the run silently reports "no containers to update".
+#
+# Timeout Protection
+#   Inspect, discovery and image-query commands are wrapped in a timeout so a
+#   hung daemon cannot stall the maintenance window. docker pull is deliberately
+#   NOT wrapped — a large image legitimately takes longer than any sane timeout,
+#   and killing it mid-layer wastes the transfer.
+#
+# Empty List Guards
+#   Each mode exits cleanly with a pointer to the relevant conf key when its
+#   container list is unconfigured for this host.
+#
+# Rebuild Failure Fallback
+#   A container that fails to rebuild is excluded from the rebuilt-list handoff
+#   file, so the follow-up restart script still gives it a normal restart pass.
+#
 # DAILY_CONTAINER_UPDATES / WEEKLY_CONTAINER_UPDATES Toggles
 #   Each mode exits cleanly when disabled. Restart scripts run regardless —
 #   update and restart are independent operations.
@@ -192,6 +214,14 @@ fi
 
 detect_hosts
 
+# Remainder mode builds its whole target list from docker ps — a hung daemon returns
+# empty and the run would report "no containers to update" instead of failing.
+if ! timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    error "Docker daemon not responding — skipping image updates"
+    notify "Docker update skipped on $(hostname) — Docker daemon not responding" "Docker Update" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
 # ==============================================================================================
 # ━━━ Container Discovery ━━━
 # ==============================================================================================
@@ -234,7 +264,7 @@ if [[ "$REMAINDER_MODE" == true ]]; then
     done
     unset _tier _tier_var _tier_arr _c
 
-    mapfile -t _all_running < <(docker ps --format '{{.Names}}' | sort)
+    mapfile -t _all_running < <(timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker ps --format '{{.Names}}' | sort)
     TARGET_CONTAINERS=()
     for _c in "${_all_running[@]}"; do
         [[ -z "${_exclude[$_c]+x}" ]] && TARGET_CONTAINERS+=("$_c")
@@ -328,13 +358,13 @@ for container in "${TARGET_CONTAINERS[@]}"; do
     [[ -z "$container" ]] && continue
     log "━━━ $ICON_CONTAINERS $container ━━━"
 
-    if ! docker inspect "$container" &>/dev/null; then
+    if ! timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker inspect "$container" &>/dev/null; then
         warn "$container — not found, skipping"
         SKIPPED+=("$container")
         continue
     fi
 
-    IMAGE=$(docker inspect --format='{{.Config.Image}}' "$container" 2>/dev/null)
+    IMAGE=$(timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker inspect --format='{{.Config.Image}}' "$container" 2>/dev/null)
     if [[ -z "$IMAGE" ]]; then
         warn "$container — could not determine image, skipping"
         SKIPPED+=("$container")
@@ -352,8 +382,8 @@ for container in "${TARGET_CONTAINERS[@]}"; do
     # Capture the image ID the container is currently running on, and the
     # image ID :latest points to before the pull. After pulling, we rebuild if
     # either a new digest landed OR the container is behind what :latest is now.
-    CONTAINER_IMAGE_ID=$(docker inspect "$container" --format='{{.Image}}' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
-    OLD_ID=$(docker image inspect "$IMAGE" --format='{{.Id}}' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+    CONTAINER_IMAGE_ID=$(timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker inspect "$container" --format='{{.Image}}' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+    OLD_ID=$(timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker image inspect "$IMAGE" --format='{{.Id}}' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
 
     log "$ICON_SYNC  Pulling $IMAGE..."
     if [[ "$ENABLE_LOGGING" == "true" ]]; then
@@ -363,7 +393,7 @@ for container in "${TARGET_CONTAINERS[@]}"; do
         docker pull "$IMAGE" >/dev/null 2>&1
         _pull_rc=$?
     fi
-    NEW_ID=$(docker image inspect "$IMAGE" --format='{{.Id}}' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
+    NEW_ID=$(timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker image inspect "$IMAGE" --format='{{.Id}}' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
 
     if [[ $_pull_rc -eq 0 ]]; then
         _pull_new=$(  [[ -n "$OLD_ID" && "$OLD_ID" != "$NEW_ID" ]] && echo true || echo false)
@@ -436,9 +466,9 @@ if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]]; then
     PRUNED_SUMMARY="(dry run)"
 else
     for _old_id in "${OLD_IMAGE_IDS[@]}"; do
-        docker rmi "$_old_id" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+        timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker rmi "$_old_id" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
     done
-    PRUNED_OUTPUT=$(docker image prune -f 2>&1)
+    PRUNED_OUTPUT=$(timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker image prune -f 2>&1)
     [[ "$ENABLE_LOGGING" == "true" ]] && echo "$PRUNED_OUTPUT" | sed 's/^/  /'
     PRUNED_SUMMARY=$(echo "$PRUNED_OUTPUT" | grep -E "^Total reclaimed" || echo "nothing reclaimed")
 fi

Docker_Essentials/docker_weekly_restart.sh

@@ -16,6 +16,33 @@
 # stopped → leave, missing → skip. Container state is always respected.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Identical to docker_daily_restart.sh, against WEEKLY_RESTART_CONTAINERS:
+#
+#   1. Build restart order
+#        → build_restart_order() sorts WEEKLY_RESTART_CONTAINERS by WATCHDOG_DEPENDENCIES
+#
+#   2. Skip anything docker_update.sh --weekly already rebuilt this run
+#        → a rebuild onto a new image already restarted it moments ago
+#
+#   3. Inspect container state
+#        missing  → skip, not an error
+#        stopped  → skip, stopped state is respected
+#        running  → restart
+#
+#   4. Restart with retry
+#        → retry_docker wraps each attempt in a timeout, up to RETRY_COUNT
+#
+#   5. Verify it stayed running
+#        → verify_running() settles for RESTART_VERIFY_WAIT then checks State.Running
+#        → a container that crashes immediately is marked failed and notified
+#
+#   6. Prune dangling images
+#        → restarts swap onto new images, leaving the old ones dangling
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -39,6 +66,26 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Docker operations require root privileges.
+#
+# Docker Presence Check
+#   Verifies the docker binary exists before execution. Notifies on absence.
+#
+# Docker Daemon Check
+#   Verifies the daemon is responsive before any restart work. Every container
+#   would otherwise fail its inspect and be logged as an unknown-status failure,
+#   burying one daemon fault under a list of bogus per-container errors.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() identifies which server is running the script and aliases
+#   HOST*_WEEKLY_RESTART_CONTAINERS and HOST*_WATCHDOG_DEPENDENCIES to the
+#   correct host's values.
+#
+# Empty List Guard
+#   Exits cleanly with a pointer to the relevant conf key if
+#   WEEKLY_RESTART_CONTAINERS is unconfigured for this host.
+#
 # Dependency Ordering
 #   Containers restart in dependency-safe order using HOST*_WATCHDOG_DEPENDENCIES.
 #   CONTAINER_DELAY seconds between dependency restart and dependent restart.
@@ -51,10 +98,10 @@
 #   All docker commands wrapped in a 30 second timeout. A hung Docker daemon
 #   cannot cause this script to hang indefinitely.
 #
-# Host Detection
-#   detect_hosts() identifies which server is running the script and aliases
-#   HOST*_WEEKLY_RESTART_CONTAINERS and HOST*_WATCHDOG_DEPENDENCIES to the
-#   correct host's values.
+# Stale Rebuild-List Guard
+#   The rebuilt-container list written by docker_update.sh --weekly is discarded
+#   if older than DOCKER_UPDATE_REBUILT_STALE_HOURS. A stale file would otherwise
+#   suppress real restarts based on an update run that never happened this week.
 #
 # Lock Acquisition
 #   acquire_lock() prevents concurrent execution.
@@ -84,6 +131,11 @@
 #   CONTAINER_DELAY
 #       Seconds to wait after restarting a dependency before starting its dependents
 #
+#   RESTART_VERIFY_WAIT
+#       Seconds verify_running() waits after docker restart before checking the
+#       container is running. Gives the process time to initialise before the
+#       state is sampled. (default: 3)
+#
 #   DOCKER_UPDATE_REBUILT_WEEKLY_FILE / DOCKER_UPDATE_REBUILT_STALE_HOURS
 #       List of containers docker_update.sh --weekly already rebuilt onto a new image
 #       this run — read here so they're not restarted a second time. Discarded as
@@ -132,6 +184,14 @@ fi
 # detect_hosts() sets MY_ID and aliases HOST*_WEEKLY_RESTART_CONTAINERS → WEEKLY_RESTART_CONTAINERS
 detect_hosts
 
+# Without this, a hung daemon fails every container's inspect individually and the summary
+# reports a list of unknown-status failures instead of the one fault that caused them.
+if ! timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    error "Docker daemon not responding — skipping weekly restart"
+    notify "Weekly restart skipped on $(hostname) — Docker daemon not responding" "Docker Weekly Restart" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
 if [[ ${#WEEKLY_RESTART_CONTAINERS[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
     warn "WEEKLY_RESTART_CONTAINERS is empty for $MY_ID — nothing to restart"
     warn "Check HOST*_WEEKLY_RESTART_CONTAINERS in host*.conf"
@@ -211,7 +271,7 @@ LAST_RESTARTED=""
 for container in "${ORDERED_RESTART[@]}"; do
     [[ -z "$container" ]] && continue
     c_start=$(date +%s)
-    c_image=$(docker inspect --format '{{.Config.Image}}' "$container" 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")
+    c_image=$(timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker inspect --format '{{.Config.Image}}' "$container" 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")
     log "━━━ $ICON_CONTAINERS $container ($c_image) ━━━"
 
     if ! timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker inspect "$container" &>/dev/null; then
@@ -281,7 +341,7 @@ if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]]; then
     warn "DRY RUN — would prune dangling images"
     PRUNED_SUMMARY="(dry run)"
 else
-    PRUNED_OUTPUT=$(docker image prune -f 2>&1)
+    PRUNED_OUTPUT=$(timeout "$DOCKER_TIMEOUT" docker image prune -f 2>&1)
     [[ "$ENABLE_LOGGING" == "true" ]] && echo "$PRUNED_OUTPUT" | sed 's/^/  /'
     PRUNED_SUMMARY=$(echo "$PRUNED_OUTPUT" | grep -E "^Total reclaimed" || echo "nothing reclaimed")
 fi

Docker_Essentials/downloaders_reset.sh

@@ -61,6 +61,15 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Failed-import purging deletes directories owned by container users.
+#
+# Dependency Check
+#   Verifies curl and jq exist before any API work. jq backs the slskd connection
+#   probe — without it the probe returns false forever, the script burns its full
+#   60 second reconnect wait, then skips every slskd section as "disconnected".
+#   A missing dependency is reported as itself rather than as a phantom outage.
+#
 # Active Transfer Protection
 #   slskd: skips users with InProgress or Queued transfers before any removal.
 #   SABnzbd: age threshold enforced before deletion.
@@ -70,6 +79,19 @@
 #   Each section validates its downloader URL before API calls. Missing or
 #   unreachable downloaders skip without affecting other sections.
 #
+# No Downloaders Guard
+#   Exits cleanly when none of SLSKD_URL, SABNZBD_URL or QBIT_URL are set for
+#   this host — nothing configured is not an error.
+#
+# Timeout Protection
+#   Every curl carries --max-time. An unresponsive downloader cannot stall the
+#   30 minute maintenance cycle or overlap the next run.
+#
+# Deletion Scope Limit
+#   qBittorrent removals pass deleteFiles=false — the torrent record is dropped
+#   but files on disk are left for the arrs to manage. This script never deletes
+#   media.
+#
 # Host Detection
 #   detect_hosts() identifies which server is running the script and aliases
 #   all HOST*_SLSKD_*, HOST*_SABNZBD_*, and HOST*_QBIT_* vars to the correct
@@ -140,6 +162,17 @@ fi
 # Lock first — wait mode since this runs every 30min and previous may still be finishing
 acquire_lock "wait"
 
+# jq backs the slskd connection probe. Missing, the probe never returns true and slskd
+# looks permanently disconnected — a 60s wait followed by silently skipped sections.
+for _dep in curl jq; do
+    if ! command -v "$_dep" &>/dev/null; then
+        error "$_dep not found — required for downloader API calls"
+        notify "Downloaders reset failed on $(hostname) — $_dep not installed" "Downloaders Reset" "warning"
+        exit 1
+    fi
+done
+unset _dep
+
 # detect_hosts() sets MY_ID and aliases all HOST*_SLSKD_*, HOST*_SABNZBD_*, HOST*_QBIT_* vars
 detect_hosts
 

Fallback/fallback.sh

@@ -89,7 +89,50 @@
 #
 # FALLBACK_ENABLED Gate
 #   Exits cleanly when disabled — safe to run on servers being rebuilt without
-#   triggering spurious fallback actions.
+#   triggering spurious fallback actions. Fail-closed: anything that is not exactly
+#   "true" counts as disabled, so a malformed toggle cannot grant this script DDNS
+#   authority and cross-server container control by accident.
+#
+# Docker Presence Check
+#   Verifies the docker binary exists before the state machine starts.
+#
+# Remote IP Resolution
+#   resolve_remote_ip() must resolve the partner before any SSH operation, so a
+#   remote command can never be issued against an unresolved or stale address.
+#
+# Asymmetric Failover / Handback
+#   Entering FALLBACK is immediate — a down partner means users are already affected.
+#   Returning requires FALLBACK_HANDBACK_STRIKES consecutive remote-up checks. The
+#   asymmetry is deliberate: protecting fast costs a few minutes of redundant
+#   coverage, handing back fast on a flapping partner costs a second outage.
+#
+# DDNS Excluded From Tier Loops
+#   The Tier 1 stop and start loops explicitly skip any container that is also in
+#   REMOTE_DDNS_CONTAINERS. DDNS is sequenced by the handoff and cutover steps alone,
+#   so ordinary tier processing can never move DNS at the wrong moment.
+#
+# Writeback Delay Gate
+#   Tier writeback rsync only runs once the outage has exceeded that tier's writeback
+#   delay. A brief blip does not trigger a full data writeback, which would cost more
+#   than the outage it is compensating for.
+#
+# FALLBACK_RSYNC_ENABLED Gate
+#   Writeback is skipped entirely when disabled, and the skip is announced rather than
+#   silent — containers still hand back, but nobody is left assuming data moved.
+#
+# Play State Sync Before Cutover
+#   Handback retries play_state_sync up to PLAY_SYNC_HANDBACK_RETRIES times before DNS
+#   cuts over, so users land on current watch state. Exhausting retries warns and
+#   proceeds — stale resume positions are not worth holding DNS on a downed service.
+#
+# Partnership Suspend Abort
+#   If partnership goes inactive mid-fallback, _abort_fallback_containers() stops the
+#   fallback containers and returns to NORMAL rather than leaving this host serving a
+#   partner it is no longer paired with.
+#
+# Container Verify Wait
+#   CONTAINER_VERIFY_WAIT seconds elapse after each start before the running check, so
+#   a container that starts and immediately crashes is caught rather than counted up.
 #
 # Version Parity Check
 #   Refuses handback if remote unRAID version doesn't match. A mismatch may
@@ -271,8 +314,11 @@ if [[ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
     exit 1
 fi
 
-# FALLBACK_ENABLED gate — exits cleanly when disabled (e.g. HOST2 being rebuilt)
-if [[ "${FALLBACK_ENABLED:-false}" == false ]]; then
+# FALLBACK_ENABLED gate — exits cleanly when disabled (e.g. HOST2 being rebuilt).
+# Fail-closed: anything that isn't exactly "true" disables fallback. Matching only the
+# literal "false" would let a typo ("no", "0", "FALSE") hand this script DDNS authority
+# and cross-server container control on a toggle nobody meant to set.
+if [[ "${FALLBACK_ENABLED:-false}" != "true" ]]; then
     warn "FALLBACK_ENABLED=false — fallback monitoring disabled"
     warn "Set FALLBACK_ENABLED=true in master.conf when both servers are ready"
     exit 0
@@ -289,8 +335,6 @@ detect_hosts
 require_partnership
 resolve_remote_ip
 
-# Validate unRAID notify script — used throughout for state change notifications
-
 [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]] && warn "DRY RUN — no container or DDNS changes will be made"
 
 # Timeout for all docker and SSH docker commands

Fallback/fallback_test.sh

@@ -41,9 +41,23 @@
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
 # iptables Safety Trap
-#   The DROP rule is removed via trap on ANY exit — normal completion, crash, error,
-#   ctrl-c. Remote connectivity is always restored regardless of test outcome.
-#   You cannot accidentally leave the remote permanently blocked.
+#   The DROP rule is removed via an EXIT trap that fires on normal completion, error
+#   exit, script crash, ctrl-c (SIGINT) and SIGTERM — verified, not assumed. Remote
+#   connectivity is restored regardless of test outcome.
+#
+# Stale Rule Sweep
+#   The trap above cannot cover SIGKILL or a power cut, which are the only ways a DROP
+#   rule survives the test. One stranded that way makes fallback.sh see the partner as
+#   permanently down and hold FALLBACK indefinitely, so pre-flight clears any leftover
+#   rule before doing anything else — including before the reachability check, which
+#   would otherwise fail and blame the network for the test's own residue.
+#
+# Root Enforcement
+#   iptables and container control require root.
+#
+# iptables Presence Check
+#   platform_require_cmd confirms iptables exists before the test begins — there is no
+#   point entering a connectivity simulation that cannot simulate anything.
 #
 # FALLBACK_ENABLED Gate
 #   Aborts if FALLBACK_ENABLED=false. Testing a disabled fallback system is
@@ -139,6 +153,28 @@ cleanup() {
 
 trap cleanup EXIT
 
+# ── Stale rule sweep — the one case the trap above cannot cover ───────────────────────────────
+# The EXIT trap fires on normal exit, error, ctrl-c and SIGTERM, but not on SIGKILL or a power
+# cut. A DROP rule stranded that way makes fallback.sh see the partner as permanently down and
+# sit in FALLBACK indefinitely — so clear any leftover from a previous run before starting.
+_clear_stale_block() {
+    [[ -z "${REMOTE_SERVER:-}" ]] && return
+    local removed=0
+    while iptables -C OUTPUT -d "$REMOTE_SERVER" -j DROP 2>/dev/null; do
+        if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]]; then
+            warn "DRY RUN — would remove stale iptables block on $REMOTE_SERVER"
+            return
+        fi
+        iptables -D OUTPUT -d "$REMOTE_SERVER" -j DROP 2>/dev/null || break
+        (( removed++ ))
+    done
+    if [[ "$removed" -gt 0 ]]; then
+        warn "$ICON_SHIELD Removed $removed stale iptables block(s) on $REMOTE_SERVER from a previous run"
+        notify "Fallback test cleared $removed stale iptables block(s) on $(hostname) — a previous test was killed before cleanup" \
+            "Fallback Test" "warning"
+    fi
+}
+
 # ==============================================================================================
 # ━━━ Setup ━━━
 # ==============================================================================================
@@ -149,7 +185,8 @@ if [[ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
 fi
 
 # FALLBACK_ENABLED gate — no point testing if fallback is disabled
-if [[ "${FALLBACK_ENABLED:-false}" == false ]]; then
+# Fail-closed, matching fallback.sh — anything not exactly "true" counts as disabled.
+if [[ "${FALLBACK_ENABLED:-false}" != "true" ]]; then
     warn "FALLBACK_ENABLED=false — fallback test aborted"
     warn "Enable fallback in master.conf before running this test"
     exit 0
@@ -238,6 +275,11 @@ echo "━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
 echo ""
 echo "━━━ $ICON_SHIELD Phase 1 — Pre-flight ━━━"
 
+# Must run before the reachability check below — a stale DROP rule from a killed run makes
+# the partner look unreachable, and the test would abort blaming the network for its own
+# leftover.
+_clear_stale_block
+
 # Remote reachable
 if ping_remote; then
     log "$REMOTE_SERVER_NAME is reachable"

Media/media_cleaner.sh

@@ -64,11 +64,45 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   acquire_lock "wait"  — wait if previous run still active
-#   detect_hosts()       — correct folder lists per host via MY_ID aliases
-#   Empty array guards   — warns and exits cleanly if no folders or patterns configured
-#   Folder existence     — skips missing folders with warning, continues others
-#   platform_require_cmd  — notify script validated before use
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Media files are owned by container users; deleting them requires root.
+#
+# Profile Required
+#   Exits with usage if no profile is given. There is no default profile — an
+#   unspecified profile must never fall through to cleaning something.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock "wait" — waits for a previous run to finish rather than
+#   skipping, so a long anime pass does not cause the media pass to be dropped.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() aliases HOST*_ANIME_CLEAN_FOLDERS / HOST*_MEDIA_CLEAN_FOLDERS
+#   to the correct host's values.
+#
+# Empty Array Guards
+#   Exits cleanly if the resolved folder list or pattern list is empty. An empty
+#   pattern list would otherwise build a find with no -iname terms and match
+#   every file in the tree.
+#
+# Clean Path Depth Guard
+#   Every folder must be an absolute path at least three levels deep before it is
+#   scanned. The patterns include *.sh, *.zip, *.rar and *.exe, so a truncated
+#   entry like /mnt/user — which passes an existence check — would delete
+#   matching files across every share on the array.
+#
+# Folder Existence
+#   Missing folders are skipped with a warning; remaining folders still process.
+#
+# Explicit Pattern List
+#   Only patterns named in ANIME_FILE_PATTERNS / MEDIA_FILE_PATTERNS are removed.
+#   The script never infers intent from file size, age, or location.
+#
+# Count Before Delete
+#   Matching files are counted first; a folder with zero matches short-circuits
+#   before any rm is constructed.
+#
+# Dry Run Support
+#   --dry-run lists every file that would be deleted and removes nothing.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
@@ -205,6 +239,19 @@ for FOLDER in "${CLEAN_FOLDERS[@]}"; do
     FOLDER_NAME=$(basename "$FOLDER")
     echo "━━━ $ICON_CLEAN $FOLDER_NAME ━━━"
 
+    # The pattern list includes *.sh, *.zip, *.rar and *.exe. A truncated entry such as
+    # /mnt/user passes the -d check below and would sweep every share on the array, so
+    # require an absolute path at least three levels deep before scanning anything.
+    _depth="${FOLDER//[^\/]/}"
+    if [[ -z "$FOLDER" || "$FOLDER" != /* || "${#_depth}" -lt 3 ]]; then
+        error "Refusing to clean unsafe path: '${FOLDER:-empty}' — expected an absolute path at least 3 levels deep"
+        notify "Media cleaner ($PROFILE) refused unsafe path on $(hostname): '${FOLDER:-empty}'" \
+            "Media Cleaner" "warning"
+        FAILED+=("${FOLDER_NAME:-empty}")
+        echo ""
+        continue
+    fi
+
     if [[ ! -d "$FOLDER" ]]; then
         warn "$FOLDER_NAME not found — skipping"
         SKIPPED+=("$FOLDER_NAME")

Media/media_shares_permissions.sh

@@ -14,6 +14,30 @@
 # or unRAID environment resets after updates.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# For each share in MEDIA_PERMISSION_SHARES:
+#
+#   1. Path safety and existence
+#        → unsafe or missing paths are refused or skipped, never scanned
+#
+#   2. Count wrong ownership (diagnostic)
+#        → find ! -user / ! -group — the number reported as "corrected"
+#
+#   3. Ownership pass — only if the count is non-zero
+#        → chown PERMISSIONS_OWNER on non-matching entries only
+#
+#   4. Directory mode pass
+#        → chmod PERMISSIONS_DIR_MODE on directories not already at that mode
+#
+#   5. File mode pass
+#        → chmod PERMISSIONS_FILE_MODE on files not already at that mode
+#        → "No such file" errors ignored: volatile dirs (Emby transcodes) race
+#
+# Every pass is conditional by design — see Conditional Passes below.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -35,16 +59,53 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   acquire_lock "wait"  — wait if previous run still active (large share scans)
-#   detect_hosts()       — correct share list per host via MY_ID aliases
-#   Empty array guard    — warns and exits cleanly if no shares configured
-#   Folder existence     — skips missing shares with warning, continues others
-#   Separate passes      — directories and files chmod'd separately for correctness
-#   Conditional passes   — only entries whose owner/mode is actually wrong are touched.
-#                          chown/chmod restamp ctime even when the value doesn't change,
-#                          and the arr cleanups gate orphan deletion on ctime
-#   platform_require_cmd  — notify script validated before use
-#   Silent by default    — only failures produce output, success is silent
+# Root Enforcement
+#   chown to an arbitrary owner requires root.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock "wait" — waits rather than skipping. Share scans are long, and
+#   this runs first in the daily window; skipping it would let arr cleanup run
+#   against uncorrected ownership.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() aliases HOST*_MEDIA_PERMISSION_SHARES to this host's shares.
+#
+# Empty Array Guard
+#   Exits cleanly if no shares are configured for this host.
+#
+# Share Path Depth Guard
+#   Every share must be an absolute path at least three levels deep before it is
+#   scanned. A truncated entry like /mnt/user passes an existence check and would
+#   chown and chmod every share on the array — which, because chown/chmod restamp
+#   ctime, would erase the age signal the arr cleanups depend on across the whole
+#   library in a single run.
+#
+# Folder Existence
+#   Missing shares are skipped with a warning; remaining shares still process.
+#
+# Separate Passes
+#   Directories and files are chmod'd in separate passes — directories need the
+#   execute bit for traversal, media files must not have it.
+#
+# Conditional Passes
+#   Only entries whose owner or mode is actually wrong are touched. This is not
+#   an optimisation: chown/chmod rewrite an inode's ctime even when the value is
+#   unchanged, so a blanket pass would restamp every file nightly and destroy
+#   ctime as an age signal. The arr cleanups gate orphan deletion on ctime, and
+#   mtime cannot substitute — imports preserve the release's original timestamp.
+#   Making any pass unconditional silently stops orphan collection.
+#
+# Transcode Race Tolerance
+#   "No such file or directory" errors from the file pass are ignored. Volatile
+#   directories such as Emby transcodes delete files mid-scan; that is expected,
+#   not a permissions failure.
+#
+# Dry Run Support
+#   --dry-run counts the dirs, files and ownership entries that would change and
+#   modifies nothing.
+#
+# Silent by Default
+#   Only failures and diagnostics produce output; a clean run is quiet.
 #
 # Diagnostic — high corrected count on every run means a container has wrong PUID/PGID:
 #   Correct values on unRAID: PUID=99 (nobody) PGID=100 (users)
@@ -153,6 +214,18 @@ PERMISSIONS_GROUP="${PERMISSIONS_OWNER##*:}"
 for SHARE in "${MEDIA_PERMISSION_SHARES[@]}"; do
     SHARE_NAME=$(basename "$SHARE")
 
+    # A truncated entry such as /mnt/user passes the -d check below and would chown/chmod
+    # every share on the array. Because chown/chmod restamp ctime, that would erase the age
+    # signal the arr cleanups gate orphan deletion on — across the whole library, in one run.
+    _depth="${SHARE//[^\/]/}"
+    if [[ -z "$SHARE" || "$SHARE" != /* || "${#_depth}" -lt 3 ]]; then
+        error "Refusing to touch unsafe path: '${SHARE:-empty}' — expected an absolute path at least 3 levels deep"
+        notify "Media permissions refused unsafe path on $(hostname): '${SHARE:-empty}'" \
+            "Media Permissions" "warning"
+        FAILED+=("${SHARE_NAME:-empty}")
+        continue
+    fi
+
     if [[ ! -d "$SHARE" ]]; then
         warn "$SHARE_NAME not found — skipping"
         SKIPPED+=("$SHARE_NAME")

Media/play_state_sync.sh

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 #   Audio    → MusicBrainz Track ID
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
-# SYNC LOGIC
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
 # For each matched item across ≥2 servers:
@@ -55,21 +55,71 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   PLAY_SYNC_ENABLED gate   — exits cleanly when disabled; no partial runs
-#   PARTNERSHIP gate         — skips remote sync when partnership is inactive
-#   Per-server reachability  — unreachable servers are skipped individually;
-#                              one offline server does not abort the entire sync
-#   User match required      — a user missing from a server is skipped for that
-#                              server; no cross-account state pollution
-#   acquire_lock             — prevents concurrent runs from racing on the same
-#                              items during the 30-minute critical window
+# Root Enforcement
+#   The probe fingerprint is written under STATE_DIR, which is not user-writable.
+#   Without root the fingerprint silently fails to persist and the change probe
+#   never suppresses anything.
+#
+# jq Dependency Check
+#   Exits if jq is missing. All API response parsing and the epoch comparisons
+#   depend on it — without jq every comparison would silently evaluate empty.
+#
+# PLAY_SYNC_ENABLED Gate
+#   Exits cleanly when disabled; no partial runs.
+#
+# PLAY_SYNC_REMOTE Gate
+#   When false, only this host's own servers are synced. Remote hosts are skipped
+#   before any network call is attempted.
+#
+# Partnership Gate
+#   Remote hosts are skipped when PARTNERSHIP_ENABLED=false. Local Emby↔Jellyfin
+#   sync still runs — a dormant partnership does not disable local work.
+#
+# Tailscale Resolution Guard
+#   A remote host whose Tailscale IP cannot be resolved is skipped rather than
+#   contacted at its literal localhost URL, which would otherwise point the sync
+#   at this host's own server and cross-contaminate state.
+#
+# Placeholder Credential Guard
+#   Servers whose API key is empty or still a placeholder are dropped from the
+#   list before any request is made.
+#
+# Per-Server Reachability
+#   Unreachable servers are skipped individually; one offline server does not
+#   abort the entire sync.
+#
+# User Match Required
+#   A user missing from a server is skipped for that server. State is never
+#   written to an unrelated account that happens to exist there.
+#
+# Forward-Only Writes
+#   The sync only pushes state forward — it never clears a Played flag or resets
+#   a resume position. The worst outcome of a bad comparison is a no-op, not
+#   erased watch history.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock prevents concurrent runs racing on the same items during the
+#   30 minute critical window. --wait switches from skip to wait for manual runs.
+#
+# Probe Staleness Ceiling
+#   PLAY_SYNC_PROBE_MAX_AGE_HOURS forces a full comparison regardless of the
+#   hash. Fetches happen every run either way, so the probe can only skip
+#   per-item processing — it can never cause a change to be missed outright.
+#
+# Dry Run Support
+#   --dry-run performs all comparisons and writes no state.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
-# CONFIGURATION (host*.conf, aliased by detect_hosts)
+# CONFIGURATION
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
+# host*.conf
+#
 #   HOST*_TRANSCODE_SERVERS  "Name|URL|APIKey|type" entries per host (emby/jellyfin)
-#                            All hosts are discovered automatically — no extra config needed.
+#                            Read directly for every HOST[0-9]+ defined — this script
+#                            deliberately does NOT call detect_hosts(), because it needs
+#                            every host's servers, not just this one's. Self is identified
+#                            by comparing HOST* values against hostname -s.
 #                            Remote host URLs have localhost rewritten to their Tailscale IP.
 #
 # master.conf
@@ -103,6 +153,10 @@
 # play_state_sync.sh --full
 #     Bypass the change probe — always run the full comparison.
 #
+# play_state_sync.sh --wait
+#     Wait for an in-progress run to finish instead of exiting. For manual runs
+#     that would otherwise be skipped by the every-30-minute scheduled pass.
+#
 # play_state_sync.sh --log
 #     Verbose output — show each item comparison.
 #
@@ -129,6 +183,13 @@ parse_args "${_FILTERED[@]}"
 # ==============================================================================================
 # ━━━ Setup ━━━
 # ==============================================================================================
+# The probe fingerprint lives under STATE_DIR — without root it silently fails to persist
+# and the change probe can never suppress a run.
+if [[ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
+    error "Must be run as root"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
 [[ "${PLAY_SYNC_ENABLED:-true}" != "true" ]] && echo "Play state sync disabled" && exit 0
 
 SYNC_TYPES="${PLAY_SYNC_TYPES:-Movie,Episode}"

Monitors/backup_verify.sh

@@ -19,6 +19,24 @@
 # to HOST*_DAILY_SYNC_SHARES. Both aliased by detect_hosts().
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+#   1. Pre-flight — connectivity to the remote, remote array mounted, version parity
+#   2. Resolve the share list (BACKUP_VERIFY_SHARES, else DAILY_SYNC_SHARES)
+#   3. Per share:
+#        a. Randomly sample BACKUP_VERIFY_SAMPLE files above BACKUP_VERIFY_MIN_SIZE
+#        b. Compute each file's MD5 locally
+#        c. Compute the same file's MD5 on the remote over SSH
+#        d. Classify: MATCH | MISMATCH | MISSING
+#   4. Report per-share and overall counts; notify on any MISMATCH and on
+#      significant MISSING counts
+#
+# Sampling rather than full verification is deliberate — a complete checksum of every
+# mirrored file would take longer than the interval between runs. Random sampling over
+# a weekly cadence surfaces systematic corruption without ever reading the whole library.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -56,9 +74,6 @@
 # SSH Timeout
 #   SSH_TIMEOUT caps all SSH calls. One hung connection does not block the run.
 #
-# Notification Validated
-#   platform_require_cmd confirms the notify script is present before use.
-#
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
 # ==============================================================================================

Monitors/bandwidth_monitor.sh

@@ -17,6 +17,24 @@
 # last 7 days activity timeline, any transfers or days exceeding BANDWIDTH_WARN_GB.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Log mode (--log-transfer), called by rsync.sh after every sync:
+#   1. Append one line: YYYY-MM-DD|HH:MM|profile|duration|status|bytes
+#   2. Trim entries older than BANDWIDTH_LOG_RETENTION days
+#   One bounded write per rsync run — never grows without limit, never rewrites history.
+#
+# Report mode (default), scheduled weekly:
+#   1. Read the accumulated log
+#   2. Aggregate per profile — run count, total bytes, average duration, failures
+#   3. Build a 7-day activity timeline
+#   4. Flag any single transfer or any single day exceeding BANDWIDTH_WARN_GB
+#
+# The two modes never run together: logging is a side effect of rsync, reporting is a
+# scheduled read. Report mode never writes to the log.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -46,9 +64,6 @@
 # Log Directory Guard
 #   Creates the log directory if it doesn't exist. Exits cleanly if unwritable.
 #
-# Notification Validated
-#   platform_require_cmd confirms the notify script is present before use.
-#
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
 # ==============================================================================================

Monitors/cert_monitor.sh

@@ -15,6 +15,23 @@
 # separate message lists all CRITICAL domains. Not one notification per domain.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+#   1. Validate openssl is present (platform_require_cmd) — without it nothing can be checked
+#   2. Per domain in CERT_MONITOR_DOMAINS:
+#        a. Open a real TLS connection with openssl s_client
+#        b. Parse notAfter from the served certificate
+#        c. Compute days remaining
+#        d. Classify: HEALTHY (silent) | WARNING (≤ CERT_WARN_DAYS)
+#                     | CRITICAL (≤ CERT_CRIT_DAYS) | FAILED (no connect / no parse)
+#   3. Batch by severity — one notification listing all WARNING domains, a separate
+#      one listing all CRITICAL domains
+#
+# A domain that fails to connect is reported as FAILED rather than assumed healthy or
+# assumed expired — an unreachable host and an expiring cert are different problems.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -44,8 +61,10 @@
 #   CERT_TIMEOUT caps each openssl connection attempt. One unreachable domain
 #   does not block the remaining domains.
 #
-# Notification Validated
-#   platform_require_cmd confirms openssl and notify script are present before use.
+# openssl Validated
+#   platform_require_cmd confirms openssl is present before any domain is checked — every
+#   check depends on it, so a missing binary is reported as itself rather than as every
+#   domain failing. The notify script is validated separately by the platform adapter.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION

Monitors/emby_session_report.sh

@@ -18,6 +18,22 @@
 # configuration issue. Silent on clean runs.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+#   1. Reachability — Emby API responding; unreachable exits cleanly rather than
+#      reporting an empty library as a real result
+#   2. Server info and uptime
+#   3. Active sessions — count, and the transcode-to-direct-play ratio
+#   4. Library counts — movies, episodes, songs
+#   5. Activity history over the last EMBY_REPORT_DAYS
+#   6. Top EMBY_REPORT_TOP_N items and most active users
+#   7. Ramdisk transcode status, read from the shared transcode state
+#
+# Every figure is queried fresh. The only notification is the transcode-ratio warning;
+# everything else is report output.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -54,9 +70,6 @@
 #   detect_hosts() aliases HOST*_EMBY_URL and HOST*_EMBY_API_KEY → EMBY_URL / EMBY_API_KEY.
 #   Each server reports on its own Emby instance automatically.
 #
-# Notification Validated
-#   platform_require_cmd confirms the notify script is present before use.
-#
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
 # ==============================================================================================

Monitors/mesh_monitor.sh

@@ -53,6 +53,13 @@
 #   collect_hosts() populates ALL_HOST_IDS — if no HOST* vars are defined the
 #   output sections iterate over an empty array and exit cleanly.
 #
+# No Root, No Lock, No detect_hosts — Deliberate
+#   This is the one script in the ecosystem that intentionally omits all three, and
+#   they should not be added. It writes nothing, so there is no state for a lock to
+#   protect and no privileged operation to justify a root gate. It reports on every
+#   node rather than acting as one, so detect_hosts() would narrow it to this host's
+#   aliases — the opposite of what it is for. Every HOST* var is read directly instead.
+#
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
 # ==============================================================================================

Monitors/smart_health.sh

@@ -19,6 +19,26 @@
 # from master.conf if dynamix.cfg is not found.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+#   1. Validate smartctl is present (platform_require_cmd)
+#   2. Resolve temperature thresholds — dynamix.cfg first, master.conf as fallback
+#   3. Enumerate drives, skipping anything in SMART_IGNORE_DRIVES
+#   4. Per drive, read live SMART attributes and evaluate:
+#        overall status              FAILED           → critical
+#        Reallocated_Sector_Ct  > 0                   → concerning
+#        Current_Pending_Sector > 0                   → concerning
+#        Offline_Uncorrectable  > 0                   → critical
+#        Temperature_Celsius    vs warn/crit thresholds
+#        Power_On_Hours                               → informational only
+#      NVMe drives expose different attribute names — detected and mapped automatically.
+#   5. Report; notify only when something crosses a threshold. Silent when all pass.
+#
+# Read-only throughout — this queries attributes the drive already maintains and never
+# starts a self-test. Running one is smart_long_test.sh's job.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -55,8 +75,9 @@
 #   Reads hot/max/hotssd/maxssd from dynamix.cfg so smart_health.sh and unRAID's
 #   dashboard use the same thresholds. Falls back to master.conf values if not found.
 #
-# Notifications Validated
-#   platform_require_cmd confirms smartctl and notify script are present before use.
+# smartctl Validated
+#   platform_require_cmd confirms smartctl is present before any drive is queried. The
+#   notify script is validated separately by the platform adapter.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION

Monitors/system_tuning_monitor.sh

@@ -65,9 +65,6 @@
 #   Trim uses tmp file + mv — partial writes during log rotation cannot corrupt
 #   the accumulated history.
 #
-# Notification Validated
-#   platform_require_cmd confirms the notify script is present before use.
-#
 # ==============================================================================================
 # STATE FILES
 # ==============================================================================================

Monitors/weekly_health_digest.sh

@@ -76,8 +76,10 @@
 #   smart profile produces no output and no notification when nothing worth
 #   reporting is found.
 #
-# Notifications Validated
-#   platform_require_cmd confirms notify and openssl are present before use.
+# openssl Validated — Non-Fatal
+#   platform_require_cmd checks openssl and, unlike the other monitors, only warns if it
+#   is missing: the SSL section is skipped and the rest of the digest still runs. The
+#   notify script is validated separately by the platform adapter.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION

Monitors/zfs_memory_snapshot.sh

@@ -79,9 +79,6 @@
 # Docker Stats Timeout
 #   DOCKER_TIMEOUT caps docker stats calls. A hung daemon does not block the report.
 #
-# Notification Validated
-#   platform_require_cmd confirms the notify script is present before use.
-#
 # ==============================================================================================
 # STATE FILES
 # ==============================================================================================

Orchestrators/array_started.sh

@@ -55,13 +55,33 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   Root check            — all launched scripts require root
-#   acquire_lock          — prevents duplicate array start launches
-#   detect_hosts()        — MY_ID in notifications
-#   platform_require_cmd  — notify validated before use
-#   chmod +x auto-fix     — non-executable scripts fixed before launch
-#   Full path on failure  — shows exact path for debugging
-#   notify on failures    — alert if any script fails to launch
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Every script launched here requires root.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock prevents duplicate array start launches. Unraid can fire the array
+#   start hook more than once, and a second pass would re-launch continuous scripts
+#   that are already running.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() sets MY_ID for notifications.
+#
+# Empty Job List Guard
+#   Exits with an error and a notification if ARRAY_START_SCRIPTS is empty. An empty
+#   list would silently bring the array up with no ramdisk, no network setup, no
+#   watchdogs and no fallback — while reporting a clean start.
+#
+# Executable Auto-Fix
+#   Non-executable scripts are chmod +x'd before launch. A permission bit lost to a
+#   git checkout or a file copy should not silently disable a boot-time component.
+#
+# Full Path on Failure
+#   Failures report the exact resolved path, so a missing script is immediately
+#   distinguishable from a script that ran and failed.
+#
+# Failure Notification
+#   Any script that fails to launch raises a notification — array start is unattended,
+#   so a silent failure here would only surface much later as a missing service.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
@@ -109,6 +129,16 @@ acquire_lock
 
 detect_hosts
 
+# An unconfigured job list would run nothing and still report "0/0 passed" — indistinguishable
+# from a healthy run. Fail loudly instead of silently doing no work.
+if [[ ${#ARRAY_START_SCRIPTS[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
+    error "ARRAY_START_SCRIPTS is empty — no array start scripts will run"
+    error "Check ARRAY_START_SCRIPTS in master.conf"
+    notify "array start scripts skipped on $(hostname) ($MY_ID) — ARRAY_START_SCRIPTS is empty" \
+        "$(basename "$0" .sh)" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
 [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]] && warn "DRY RUN — scripts will not be launched"
 
 # ==============================================================================================

Orchestrators/array_stopping.sh

@@ -40,11 +40,28 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   Root check            — all stop scripts require root
-#   acquire_lock          — prevents concurrent array stop runs
-#   detect_hosts()        — MY_ID in notifications and logs
-#   platform_require_cmd  — notify validated before use
-#   notify on failures    — alert if any stop script fails
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Every stop script launched here requires root.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock prevents concurrent array stop runs. Two overlapping shutdown
+#   sequences would fight over the same containers.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() sets MY_ID for notifications and logs.
+#
+# Empty Job List Guard
+#   Exits with an error and a notification if ARRAY_STOP_SCRIPTS is empty. An empty
+#   list means the array stops without saving the conf cache or gracefully stopping
+#   containers — the failure would only be discovered at the next boot.
+#
+# Non-Fatal Steps
+#   A failing stop script is recorded and the remaining ones still run. Abandoning the
+#   shutdown sequence partway would leave more state unsaved than continuing does.
+#
+# Failure Notification
+#   Any failing stop script raises a notification. Shutdown is unattended and its
+#   failures are invisible until they cause a problem on the way back up.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
@@ -97,6 +114,16 @@ fi
 
 detect_hosts
 
+# An unconfigured job list would run nothing and still report "0/0 passed" — indistinguishable
+# from a healthy run. Fail loudly instead of silently doing no work.
+if [[ ${#ARRAY_STOP_SCRIPTS[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
+    error "ARRAY_STOP_SCRIPTS is empty — no array stop scripts will run"
+    error "Check ARRAY_STOP_SCRIPTS in master.conf"
+    notify "array stop scripts skipped on $(hostname) ($MY_ID) — ARRAY_STOP_SCRIPTS is empty" \
+        "$(basename "$0" .sh)" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
 [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]] && warn "DRY RUN — no stop scripts will be executed"
 
 # ==============================================================================================

Orchestrators/critical_sync_maintenance.sh

@@ -44,11 +44,31 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   Root check            — rsync and container stop/start require root
-#   acquire_lock "strict" — no pile-up; skip cycle if prior run still active
-#   detect_hosts()        — MY_ID and REMOTE_ID for routing and logs
-#   resolve_remote_ip     — confirms remote reachability before any transfer
-#   RSYNC_ENABLED gate    — global kill switch respected before any rsync call
+# Root Enforcement
+#   rsync over SSH and container stop/start both require root.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock in strict mode — a cycle is skipped rather than queued if the previous
+#   one is still running. At a 30-minute cadence, queuing would let a slow sync stack
+#   windows behind it.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() sets MY_ID and REMOTE_ID for routing and logs.
+#
+# Empty Job List Guard
+#   Exits with an error and a notification if CRITICAL_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS is empty —
+#   a silently empty critical tier would stop downloader resets and play-state sync
+#   while still reporting success every 30 minutes.
+#
+# Remote IP Resolution
+#   resolve_remote_ip confirms the partner is reachable before any transfer is attempted.
+#
+# RSYNC_ENABLED Gate
+#   The global kill switch is respected before any rsync call, so disabling rsync
+#   ecosystem-wide genuinely stops it here too.
+#
+# Non-Fatal Steps
+#   A failing job is recorded and the rest of the tier still runs.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
@@ -98,6 +118,16 @@ fi
 acquire_lock "strict"
 
 detect_hosts
+
+# An unconfigured job list would run nothing and still report "0/0 passed" — indistinguishable
+# from a healthy run. Fail loudly instead of silently doing no work.
+if [[ ${#CRITICAL_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
+    error "CRITICAL_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS is empty — no critical maintenance scripts will run"
+    error "Check CRITICAL_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS in master.conf"
+    notify "critical maintenance scripts skipped on $(hostname) ($MY_ID) — CRITICAL_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS is empty" \
+        "$(basename "$0" .sh)" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
 resolve_remote_ip
 
 [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]] && warn "DRY RUN — no changes will be made"

Orchestrators/daily_sync_maintenance.sh

@@ -59,13 +59,40 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   Root check           — rsync and docker operations require root
-#   acquire_lock         — prevents concurrent daily windows
-#   detect_hosts()       — aliases correct per-host share lists
-#   check_connectivity   — verified before any rsync
-#   check_remote_rootfs  — aborts rsync if remote rootfs nearly full
-#   Non-fatal jobs       — a failed job logs and continues; remaining jobs still run
-#   notify on failure    — successful daily run produces no notification
+# Root Enforcement
+#   rsync and docker operations require root.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock prevents two daily windows overlapping — the window is long and a
+#   second pass would contend for the same shares and containers.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() aliases the correct per-host share and script lists.
+#
+# Empty Job List Guard
+#   Exits with an error and a notification if DAILY_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS is empty. This
+#   is the largest tier in the ecosystem — an empty list would silently skip git pull,
+#   permissions, cleaners, arr cleanup and docker updates while reporting a clean run.
+#
+# Connectivity Check
+#   check_connectivity is verified before any rsync is attempted.
+#
+# Remote Rootfs Check
+#   check_remote_rootfs aborts rsync if the remote rootfs is nearly full, rather than
+#   pushing data to a partner that cannot hold it.
+#
+# Drive Temperature Escalation
+#   rsync.sh's exit code is honoured per share: exit 1 (temp WARN) skips that share and
+#   continues; exit 2 (temp CRITICAL) sets ABORT_ALL_SYNCS so every remaining share in
+#   the window is skipped and a notification is raised. Continuing to hammer drives that
+#   are already too hot is how a thermal warning becomes a dead disk.
+#
+# Non-Fatal Jobs
+#   A failed job is logged and the remaining jobs still run. Partial completion of a
+#   maintenance window beats abandoning it at the first error.
+#
+# Quiet on Success
+#   A successful daily run produces no notification — only failures surface.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
@@ -123,6 +150,16 @@ if ! command -v docker &>/dev/null; then
 fi
 
 detect_hosts
+
+# An unconfigured job list would run nothing and still report "0/0 passed" — indistinguishable
+# from a healthy run. Fail loudly instead of silently doing no work.
+if [[ ${#DAILY_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
+    error "DAILY_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS is empty — no daily maintenance scripts will run"
+    error "Check DAILY_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS in master.conf"
+    notify "daily maintenance scripts skipped on $(hostname) ($MY_ID) — DAILY_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS is empty" \
+        "$(basename "$0" .sh)" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
 resolve_remote_ip
 
 acquire_lock

Orchestrators/intermediate_sync_maintenance.sh

@@ -40,13 +40,36 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   Root check           — scripts called here require root
-#   acquire_lock         — prevents concurrent intermediate windows
-#   detect_hosts()       — aliases correct per-host share lists
-#   check_connectivity   — verified before any rsync (skipped if no shares)
-#   check_remote_rootfs  — aborts rsync if remote rootfs nearly full
-#   Non-fatal jobs       — a failed arr_sync warns but does not block rsync or artwork fetch
-#   Minimal on success   — runs 6x/day; full breakdown only on failure or --log
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Every script called from here requires root.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock prevents concurrent intermediate windows.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() aliases the correct per-host share lists.
+#
+# Empty Job List Guard
+#   Exits with an error and a notification if INTERMEDIATE_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS is empty,
+#   rather than running six no-op windows a day that all report success.
+#
+# Connectivity Check
+#   check_connectivity is verified before any rsync, and skipped entirely when no shares
+#   are configured — there is nothing to reach a partner for.
+#
+# Remote Rootfs Check
+#   check_remote_rootfs aborts rsync if the remote rootfs is nearly full.
+#
+# Drive Temperature Escalation
+#   rsync.sh's exit code is honoured per share: exit 1 skips that share, exit 2 aborts
+#   every remaining sync in the window and notifies.
+#
+# Non-Fatal Jobs
+#   A failing arr_sync warns but does not block rsync or the artwork fetch that follow it.
+#
+# Minimal on Success
+#   Runs six times a day, so the full breakdown only prints on failure or with --log.
+#   A quiet run is the normal outcome and should not fill the log.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
@@ -101,6 +124,16 @@ fi
 acquire_lock
 
 detect_hosts
+
+# An unconfigured job list would run nothing and still report "0/0 passed" — indistinguishable
+# from a healthy run. Fail loudly instead of silently doing no work.
+if [[ ${#INTERMEDIATE_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
+    error "INTERMEDIATE_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS is empty — no intermediate maintenance scripts will run"
+    error "Check INTERMEDIATE_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS in master.conf"
+    notify "intermediate maintenance scripts skipped on $(hostname) ($MY_ID) — INTERMEDIATE_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS is empty" \
+        "$(basename "$0" .sh)" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
 resolve_remote_ip
 
 [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]] && warn "DRY RUN — no changes will be made"

Orchestrators/monthly_maintenance.sh

@@ -45,12 +45,34 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   Root check      — ZFS scrub, SMART tests require root
-#   acquire_lock    — prevents concurrent monthly runs
-#   detect_hosts()  — MY_ID in notifications and logs
-#   Uptime gate     — MONTHLY_UPTIME_THRESHOLD_DAYS must be met
-#   Interval gate   — MONTHLY_RUN_INTERVAL_DAYS since last run must be met
-#   --force flag    — bypasses both gates for manual override
+# Root Enforcement
+#   ZFS scrub and SMART tests require root.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock prevents concurrent monthly runs. These are long jobs — a scrub can run
+#   for hours — and two at once would double the I/O cost for no benefit.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() sets MY_ID for notifications and logs.
+#
+# Empty Job List Guard
+#   Exits with an error and a notification if MONTHLY_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS is empty. A
+#   monthly job that silently does nothing is the hardest kind to notice missing.
+#
+# Uptime Gate
+#   MONTHLY_UPTIME_THRESHOLD_DAYS must be met before the run proceeds. Heavy full-disk
+#   work immediately after a boot competes with everything else still starting up.
+#
+# Interval Gate
+#   MONTHLY_RUN_INTERVAL_DAYS since the last successful run must have elapsed. The
+#   schedule fires more often than the work should actually happen, so the gate — not
+#   the cron entry — is what defines the real cadence.
+#
+# Force Override
+#   --force bypasses both gates for a deliberate manual run.
+#
+# Non-Fatal Steps
+#   A failing job is recorded and the remaining jobs still run.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
@@ -113,6 +135,16 @@ acquire_lock
 
 detect_hosts
 
+# An unconfigured job list would run nothing and still report "0/0 passed" — indistinguishable
+# from a healthy run. Fail loudly instead of silently doing no work.
+if [[ ${#MONTHLY_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
+    error "MONTHLY_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS is empty — no monthly maintenance scripts will run"
+    error "Check MONTHLY_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS in master.conf"
+    notify "monthly maintenance scripts skipped on $(hostname) ($MY_ID) — MONTHLY_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS is empty" \
+        "$(basename "$0" .sh)" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
 [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]]   && warn "DRY RUN — no scripts will be executed"
 [[ "$FORCE_RUN" == true ]] && warn "FORCE — uptime and interval gates bypassed"
 

Orchestrators/sunday_morning_coffee_report.sh

@@ -39,12 +39,33 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   Root check        — required for the docker/system reads used in the report
-#   acquire_lock      — prevents overlapping weekly runs
-#   detect_hosts()    — MY_ID in banner and summary
-#   Non-fatal steps   — a failed script is logged; remaining scripts still run
-#   Flag pass-through — --dry-run and --log forwarded to all child scripts
-#   notify() on failure — pushed only outside --dry-run, matching the runtime-mode contract below
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Required for the docker and system reads the report is built from.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock prevents overlapping weekly runs.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() sets MY_ID for the banner and summary.
+#
+# Empty Job List Guard
+#   Exits with an error and a notification if COFFEE_REPORT_SCRIPTS is empty. A report
+#   that silently contains nothing still arrives looking like a report.
+#
+# Read-Only by Composition
+#   Every child here is a reporting script. This orchestrator changes nothing itself —
+#   it only sequences reads and assembles their output.
+#
+# Non-Fatal Steps
+#   A failing script is logged and the remaining ones still run, so one unavailable
+#   subsystem costs a section of the report rather than the whole thing.
+#
+# Flag Pass-Through
+#   --dry-run and --log are forwarded to every child script.
+#
+# Notification Contract
+#   notify() fires on failure only outside --dry-run, matching the runtime-mode contract
+#   below — a dry run never sends anything outward.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
@@ -91,6 +112,16 @@ acquire_lock
 
 detect_hosts
 
+# An unconfigured job list would run nothing and still report "0/0 passed" — indistinguishable
+# from a healthy run. Fail loudly instead of silently doing no work.
+if [[ ${#COFFEE_REPORT_SCRIPTS[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
+    error "COFFEE_REPORT_SCRIPTS is empty — no coffee report scripts will run"
+    error "Check COFFEE_REPORT_SCRIPTS in master.conf"
+    notify "coffee report scripts skipped on $(hostname) ($MY_ID) — COFFEE_REPORT_SCRIPTS is empty" \
+        "$(basename "$0" .sh)" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
 # ==============================================================================================
 # ━━━ Helpers ━━━
 # ==============================================================================================

Orchestrators/transcode_management.sh

@@ -50,12 +50,37 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   Root check      — mount and docker operations require root
-#   acquire_lock    — prevents concurrent 7-minute cycles overlapping
-#   detect_hosts()  — aliases RAMDISK_PATH, TRANSCODE_SSD, RAMDISK_WARN_GB per host
-#   --dry-run       — passed through to every script in TRANSCODE_MANAGEMENT_SCRIPTS
-#   Exit code       — worst exit code across all scripts returned to cron
-#   notify()        — pushed on failure, skipped in --dry-run
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Mount and docker operations require root.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock prevents concurrent 7-minute cycles overlapping. Cleanup and the manager
+#   both touch the same ramdisk, and two cycles at once could have one deleting files
+#   while the other is measuring usage to decide whether to flip.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() aliases RAMDISK_PATH, TRANSCODE_SSD and RAMDISK_WARN_GB per host.
+#
+# Empty Job List Guard
+#   Exits with an error and a notification if TRANSCODE_MANAGEMENT_SCRIPTS is empty —
+#   without it the ramdisk would silently stop being cleaned or flipped, and the first
+#   symptom would be a full ramdisk stalling playback.
+#
+# Ordering Is Load-Bearing
+#   Cleanup runs before the manager so the manager measures real active-session usage
+#   rather than usage inflated by stale files. Reversing them would trigger flips that
+#   a cleanup two seconds later would have made unnecessary.
+#
+# Dry Run Propagation
+#   --dry-run is passed through to every script in TRANSCODE_MANAGEMENT_SCRIPTS.
+#
+# Any-Failure Exit Code
+#   Exits 1 if any child failed, 0 otherwise — the individual exit codes are not
+#   propagated, only whether anything failed. A failure in an early child is therefore
+#   never masked by a later success.
+#
+# Notification Contract
+#   notify() fires on failure and is skipped in --dry-run.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
@@ -112,6 +137,16 @@ fi
 # detect_hosts() sets MY_ID and aliases all HOST*_TRANSCODE_* vars
 detect_hosts
 
+# An unconfigured job list would run nothing and still report "0/0 passed" — indistinguishable
+# from a healthy run. Fail loudly instead of silently doing no work.
+if [[ ${#TRANSCODE_MANAGEMENT_SCRIPTS[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
+    error "TRANSCODE_MANAGEMENT_SCRIPTS is empty — no transcode management scripts will run"
+    error "Check TRANSCODE_MANAGEMENT_SCRIPTS in master.conf"
+    notify "transcode management scripts skipped on $(hostname) ($MY_ID) — TRANSCODE_MANAGEMENT_SCRIPTS is empty" \
+        "$(basename "$0" .sh)" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
 [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]] && warn "DRY RUN — passing through to child scripts"
 
 # ==============================================================================================

Orchestrators/watchdog_orchestrator.sh

@@ -49,11 +49,34 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   Root check       — watchdog operations require root
-#   acquire_lock     — strict; no pile-up if prior cycle still active
-#   detect_hosts()   — MY_ID in logs and notifications
-#   Array check      — exits early if /mnt/user is not shfs-mounted
-#   Startup grace    — WATCHDOG_STARTUP_GRACE respected before any checks
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Every watchdog launched from here requires root. Failing once at the top gives one
+#   clear error instead of the same permission failure repeated per child.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock in strict mode — if the previous cycle is still running, this one exits
+#   rather than queuing. At a one-minute cadence a waiting lock would pile up cycles
+#   behind a slow watchdog and eventually run them all at once.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() sets MY_ID for logs and notifications.
+#
+# Empty Job List Guard
+#   Exits with an error and a notification if WATCHDOG_ORCHESTRATOR_SCRIPTS is empty.
+#   Without it the cycle reports "0/0 passed" and exits 0 every minute — indistinguishable
+#   from a healthy run, while nothing at all is being monitored.
+#
+# Array Check
+#   Exits early if /mnt/user is not shfs-mounted. Watchdogs that inspect shares would
+#   otherwise read an unmounted array as missing data and act on it.
+#
+# Startup Grace
+#   WATCHDOG_STARTUP_GRACE is respected before any checks run, so containers still
+#   initialising after boot are not judged as unhealthy.
+#
+# Non-Fatal Steps
+#   run_orch_child() records a failing or missing watchdog and continues. One broken
+#   watchdog never suppresses the rest of the chain.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
@@ -104,6 +127,16 @@ acquire_lock
 
 detect_hosts
 
+# An unconfigured job list would run nothing and still report "0/0 passed" — indistinguishable
+# from a healthy run. Fail loudly instead of silently doing no work.
+if [[ ${#WATCHDOG_ORCHESTRATOR_SCRIPTS[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
+    error "WATCHDOG_ORCHESTRATOR_SCRIPTS is empty — no watchdogs will run"
+    error "Check WATCHDOG_ORCHESTRATOR_SCRIPTS in master.conf"
+    notify "watchdogs skipped on $(hostname) ($MY_ID) — WATCHDOG_ORCHESTRATOR_SCRIPTS is empty" \
+        "$(basename "$0" .sh)" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
 log "$ICON_GEAR Config: grace=${WATCHDOG_STARTUP_GRACE}s heartbeat=${WATCHDOG_ORCHESTRATOR_HEARTBEAT:-true}/${WATCHDOG_ORCHESTRATOR_HEARTBEAT_HOURS:-1}hr scripts=${#WATCHDOG_ORCHESTRATOR_SCRIPTS[@]}"
 log "$ICON_WATCHDOG Order: $(for s in "${WATCHDOG_ORCHESTRATOR_SCRIPTS[@]}"; do printf '%s ' "${s##*/}"; done)"
 

Orchestrators/weekly_sync_maintenance.sh

@@ -40,15 +40,35 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   Root check            — stop/start containers and rsync require root
-#   acquire_lock          — prevents concurrent weekly windows
-#   detect_hosts()        — MY_ID in banner, summary, and notifications
-#   check_connectivity    — verifies remote before any remote operations
-#   check_remote_rootfs   — aborts rsync if remote rootfs nearly full
-#   DOCKER_TIMEOUT        — all docker calls protected
-#   SSH_TIMEOUT           — all SSH calls protected
-#   platform_require_cmd  — notify validated before use
-#   Silent on success     — runs weekly; only failures warrant notification
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Container stop/start and rsync both require root.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock prevents concurrent weekly windows. This window stops Emby and the auth
+#   stack — two overlapping runs would fight over the same critical containers.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() sets MY_ID for the banner, summary and notifications.
+#
+# Empty Job List Guard
+#   Exits with an error and a notification if WEEKLY_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS is empty, rather
+#   than taking the weekly outage window and doing nothing with it.
+#
+# Connectivity Check
+#   check_connectivity verifies the remote before any remote operation is attempted.
+#
+# Remote Rootfs Check
+#   check_remote_rootfs aborts rsync if the remote rootfs is nearly full.
+#
+# Timeout Protection
+#   DOCKER_TIMEOUT bounds every docker call and SSH_TIMEOUT every SSH call, so neither a
+#   hung daemon nor an unresponsive partner can hold the weekly window open indefinitely.
+#
+# Non-Fatal Steps
+#   A failing job is recorded and the remaining jobs still run.
+#
+# Silent on Success
+#   Runs weekly; only failures warrant a notification.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
@@ -109,6 +129,16 @@ if ! command -v docker &>/dev/null; then
 fi
 
 detect_hosts
+
+# An unconfigured job list would run nothing and still report "0/0 passed" — indistinguishable
+# from a healthy run. Fail loudly instead of silently doing no work.
+if [[ ${#WEEKLY_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
+    error "WEEKLY_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS is empty — no weekly maintenance scripts will run"
+    error "Check WEEKLY_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS in master.conf"
+    notify "weekly maintenance scripts skipped on $(hostname) ($MY_ID) — WEEKLY_MAINTENANCE_SCRIPTS is empty" \
+        "$(basename "$0" .sh)" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
 resolve_remote_ip
 
 WINDOW_START=$(date +%s)

System_Essentials/clear_logs.sh

@@ -16,9 +16,33 @@
 # SABnzbd) grow fastest — inactive containers typically remain small.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Two independent passes, each with its own threshold:
+#
+#   System logs — every path in LOG_FILES
+#     size < LOG_MIN_SIZE_MB    → skip, recent diagnostic history is worth keeping
+#     size >= LOG_MIN_SIZE_MB   → truncate in place
+#
+#   Docker logs — /var/lib/docker/containers/**/*-json.log
+#     container name resolved for reporting via docker inspect
+#     size < LOG_DOCKER_MAX_MB  → skip
+#     size >= LOG_DOCKER_MAX_MB → truncate in place
+#     containers directory missing → whole pass skipped, not an error
+#
+# Truncation is always `: > file`, never rm — see Truncate, Never Delete below.
+# Freed bytes are totalled per pass and reported in the summary.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
+# Truncate, Never Delete
+#   Logs are emptied in place, never removed. The writing process keeps its open file
+#   handle and keeps logging; deleting the inode would leave a running daemon writing
+#   to a file nothing can read, and would consume more tmpfs, not less.
+#
 # Size Thresholds, Not Blind Truncation
 #   A 2MB syslog contains useful recent diagnostic history — not worth clearing.
 #   A 500MB Docker log is consuming rootfs and contains mostly noise — clear it.

System_Essentials/conf_cache_restore.sh

@@ -22,6 +22,21 @@
 # Own conf is never in the backup — it's always on disk.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+#   1. Gates — PARTNERSHIP_ENABLED, and a validated PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE path
+#   2. No backup directory → exit 0, nothing to restore
+#   3. For each host*.conf in the backup:
+#        own conf              → skip (always on disk)
+#        already in RAM cache  → skip — conf_sync.sh reached the partner, its copy
+#                                is fresher than this one
+#        otherwise             → copy into the RAM cache, mode 600
+#   4. Clear the backup unconditionally — see Remove After Use below
+#
+# Counterpart to conf_cache_save.sh, which writes this backup at array stop.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -40,9 +55,73 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   require_partnership — exits early if PARTNERSHIP_ENABLED=false
-#   detect_hosts()      — determines which conf files belong to partners vs self
-#   No-backup guard     — exits cleanly if PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE doesn't exist
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Reads the plugin-directory backup and writes the RAM cache.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock prevents this racing conf_cache_save.sh or the conf cache watchdog
+#   over the same backup directory — this script deletes it at the end.
+#
+# Partnership Gate
+#   require_partnership exits early if PARTNERSHIP_ENABLED=false.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() determines which conf files are partner confs and which is our own.
+#
+# Cache Path Sanity Guard
+#   PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE is validated as an absolute path at least three levels deep
+#   before anything is read or removed. This script ends with rm -rf on that path, and
+#   the directory-exists check alone would not catch a collapsed value — / is a
+#   directory.
+#
+# No-Backup Guard
+#   Exits cleanly if the backup directory does not exist — the normal case when the
+#   partner was reachable at boot.
+#
+# Fresh-Copy Precedence
+#   A conf already present in the RAM cache is never overwritten from the backup.
+#   conf_sync.sh reaching the partner means its copy is current; the backup is by
+#   definition older.
+#
+# Own-Conf Exclusion
+#   Our own conf is never restored from the backup over the live on-disk copy.
+#
+# Credential File Permissions
+#   The RAM cache directory is created 700 and each restored conf written 600 — these
+#   carry partner NPM/lldap passwords and API keys and live under a world-readable /tmp.
+#
+# Dry Run Support
+#   --dry-run reports what would be restored and removed, and changes nothing.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# CONFIGURATION
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# master.conf
+#
+#   PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE
+#       Reboot-surviving backup written by conf_cache_save.sh. Consumed and cleared here.
+#
+#   CONF_RAM_CACHE_DIR
+#       Destination RAM cache (tmpfs, /tmp/.cache/vv/d) that load_config.sh reads
+#       partner vars from.
+#
+#   PARTNERSHIP_ENABLED
+#       Checked via require_partnership().
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# RUNTIME MODES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# conf_cache_restore.sh
+#     Restore partner confs into the RAM cache, then clear the backup.
+#     Runs at array start, after conf_sync.sh has had its chance.
+#
+# conf_cache_restore.sh --dry-run
+#     Report what would be restored and removed without changing anything
+#
+# conf_cache_restore.sh --log
+#     Verbose per-file output
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 
@@ -50,11 +129,31 @@ SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../load_config.sh"
 
 parse_args "$@"
+
+if [[ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
+    error "Must be run as root"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+acquire_lock
+
 detect_hosts
 require_partnership
 
 RAM_CACHE="$CONF_RAM_CACHE_DIR"
-SAVE_DIR="$PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE"
+SAVE_DIR="${PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE:-}"
+
+# SAVE_DIR is rm -rf'd at the end of this script and is built from ${SCRIPTS_DIR}. If that is
+# ever unset the path collapses toward / — and the -d check below would pass, since / is a
+# directory. Require an absolute path at least three levels deep before touching it.
+_slashes="${SAVE_DIR//[^\/]/}"
+if [[ -z "$SAVE_DIR" || "$SAVE_DIR" != /* || "${#_slashes}" -lt 3 ]]; then
+    error "PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE is unset or unsafe ('${SAVE_DIR:-unset}') — refusing to restore or clear"
+    notify "conf_cache_restore aborted on $(hostname) — PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE is '${SAVE_DIR:-unset}'" \
+        "Conf Cache Restore" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
+unset _slashes
 
 [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]] && warn "DRY RUN — no changes will be made"
 
@@ -80,8 +179,10 @@ for conf in "$SAVE_DIR"/host*.conf; do
         continue
     fi
 
-    mkdir -p "$RAM_CACHE"
-    if cp "$conf" "$RAM_CACHE/$base"; then
+    # Partner confs carry credentials (NPM/lldap passwords, API keys). Default umask would
+    # leave them 644 in a world-readable /tmp path — restrict on the way in, not afterwards.
+    mkdir -p "$RAM_CACHE" && chmod 700 "$RAM_CACHE"
+    if cp "$conf" "$RAM_CACHE/$base" && chmod 600 "$RAM_CACHE/$base"; then
         echo "Restored $base from persistent backup → RAM cache ✅"
         (( restored++ ))
     else

System_Essentials/conf_cache_save.sh

@@ -18,6 +18,19 @@
 # Path adapts to storage mode: $SCRIPTS_DIR/.cache/vv/d (internal or appdata).
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+#   1. Gates — PARTNERSHIP_ENABLED, and a validated PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE path
+#   2. No RAM cache present → exit 0, nothing to snapshot
+#   3. For each host*.conf in the RAM cache:
+#        own conf     → skip (always on disk, never needs saving)
+#        partner conf → copy to $PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE, mode 600
+#
+# Counterpart to conf_cache_restore.sh, which consumes and then clears this backup
+# at the next array start.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -34,9 +47,70 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   require_partnership — exits early if PARTNERSHIP_ENABLED=false
-#   detect_hosts()      — determines which confs to save (partner confs only)
-#   No-cache guard      — exits cleanly if RAM cache is empty or missing
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Writes into $PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE under the plugin directory.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock prevents this racing conf_cache_restore.sh or the conf cache
+#   watchdog over the same backup directory.
+#
+# Partnership Gate
+#   require_partnership exits early if PARTNERSHIP_ENABLED=false.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() determines which confs are partner confs and which is our own.
+#
+# Cache Path Sanity Guard
+#   PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE is validated as an absolute path at least three levels
+#   deep before anything is written. It is built from ${SCRIPTS_DIR}; if that were
+#   unset the copy target would collapse to "/host2.conf", dropping partner
+#   passwords and API keys at the filesystem root.
+#
+# No-Cache Guard
+#   Exits cleanly if the RAM cache is missing or empty — nothing to snapshot is a
+#   normal state, not an error.
+#
+# Own-Conf Exclusion
+#   Our own conf is never written into the partner backup. Restoring it later
+#   would overwrite live local config with a stale copy.
+#
+# Credential File Permissions
+#   The backup directory is created 700 and each conf written 600. These files
+#   carry partner NPM/lldap passwords and API keys and must not inherit the
+#   default umask on a path that survives reboot.
+#
+# Dry Run Support
+#   --dry-run reports every file it would write and writes none.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# CONFIGURATION
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# master.conf
+#
+#   PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE
+#       Reboot-surviving destination for the partner conf backup. Built from
+#       ${SCRIPTS_DIR}, so it follows the active storage mode.
+#
+#   CONF_RAM_CACHE_DIR
+#       Source RAM cache (tmpfs, /tmp/.cache/vv/d) populated by conf_sync.sh.
+#
+#   PARTNERSHIP_ENABLED
+#       Checked via require_partnership().
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# RUNTIME MODES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# conf_cache_save.sh
+#     Snapshot partner confs from the RAM cache to the persistent backup.
+#     Runs first in ARRAY_STOP_SCRIPTS.
+#
+# conf_cache_save.sh --dry-run
+#     Report what would be saved without writing anything
+#
+# conf_cache_save.sh --log
+#     Verbose per-file output
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 
@@ -44,11 +118,30 @@ SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../load_config.sh"
 
 parse_args "$@"
+
+if [[ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
+    error "Must be run as root"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+acquire_lock
+
 detect_hosts
 require_partnership
 
 RAM_CACHE="$CONF_RAM_CACHE_DIR"
-SAVE_DIR="$PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE"
+SAVE_DIR="${PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE:-}"
+
+# Credentials get written here. An empty SAVE_DIR would make the cp target "/host2.conf",
+# dropping partner passwords and API keys at the filesystem root.
+_slashes="${SAVE_DIR//[^\/]/}"
+if [[ -z "$SAVE_DIR" || "$SAVE_DIR" != /* || "${#_slashes}" -lt 3 ]]; then
+    error "PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE is unset or unsafe ('${SAVE_DIR:-unset}') — refusing to save partner confs"
+    notify "conf_cache_save aborted on $(hostname) — PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE is '${SAVE_DIR:-unset}'" \
+        "Conf Cache Save" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
+unset _slashes
 
 [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]] && warn "DRY RUN — no files will be written"
 
@@ -69,8 +162,10 @@ for conf in "$RAM_CACHE"/host*.conf; do
         continue
     fi
 
-    mkdir -p "$SAVE_DIR"
-    if cp "$conf" "$SAVE_DIR/$base"; then
+    # Partner confs carry credentials — restrict on write rather than leaving them at the
+    # default umask on a path that survives reboot.
+    mkdir -p "$SAVE_DIR" && chmod 700 "$SAVE_DIR"
+    if cp "$conf" "$SAVE_DIR/$base" && chmod 600 "$SAVE_DIR/$base"; then
         echo "Saved $base → $SAVE_DIR ✅"
         (( saved++ ))
     else

System_Essentials/conf_sync.sh

@@ -25,6 +25,21 @@
 # works whether the remote is in internal or appdata storage mode.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+#   1. Gates — PARTNERSHIP_ENABLED, CONF_SYNC_ENABLED
+#   2. Cache own conf into the local RAM cache (skipped in --push-only / --pull-only)
+#   3. Per partner:
+#        a. Resolve the partner's own SCRIPTS_DIR by reading their varaverk.cfg over SSH,
+#           so a partner in appdata storage mode is still found
+#        b. Pull  — scp their host*.conf from their disk into our RAM cache
+#        c. Push  — scp our host*.conf into their RAM cache
+#      A partner that fails SSH is counted and skipped; the others still sync.
+#
+# Every file written locally or remotely is restricted to 600, in a 700 directory.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -42,10 +57,65 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   require_partnership — exits early if PARTNERSHIP_ENABLED=false
-#   detect_hosts()      — partner list for push/pull routing
-#   acquire_lock        — prevents concurrent sync runs
-#   SSH reachability    — partners that fail SSH are skipped, not fatal
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Reads the on-disk conf and writes the RAM cache; SSH/scp run as root.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock prevents concurrent sync runs writing the same cache files.
+#
+# Partnership Gate
+#   require_partnership exits early if PARTNERSHIP_ENABLED=false.
+#
+# CONF_SYNC_ENABLED Gate
+#   Exits cleanly when disabled, without removing it from the schedule.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() builds the partner list used for push/pull routing.
+#
+# SSH Reachability
+#   Partners that fail SSH are counted and skipped, never fatal — one unreachable
+#   partner does not prevent the others from syncing.
+#
+# SSH Timeouts
+#   Every ssh and scp call is wrapped in timeout with ConnectTimeout and BatchMode,
+#   so an unresponsive or password-prompting partner cannot stall the run.
+#
+# Remote Path Discovery
+#   The partner's SCRIPTS_DIR is read from their own varaverk.cfg rather than assumed,
+#   so a partner in appdata storage mode is still found. Falls back to the default
+#   plugin path if the file cannot be read.
+#
+# Credential File Permissions
+#   Cache directories are created 700 and every conf written 600 — on both ends. These
+#   files carry NPM/lldap passwords and API keys, and the cache lives under a
+#   world-readable /tmp path. The pushed copy is chmod'd on the partner too, since our
+#   own credentials land on their disk.
+#
+# Dry Run Support
+#   --dry-run reports every pull and push without transferring anything.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# CONFIGURATION
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# master.conf
+#
+#   CONF_SYNC_ENABLED
+#       Master toggle for conf syncing (default: true)
+#
+#   CONF_RAM_CACHE_DIR
+#       tmpfs cache both ends read partner vars from (/tmp/.cache/vv/d). Cleared every
+#       reboot, which is why conf_cache_save.sh / conf_cache_restore.sh exist.
+#
+#   SSH_KEY
+#       Key used for all partner ssh/scp operations
+#
+#   PARTNERSHIP_ENABLED
+#       Checked via require_partnership()
+#
+# host*.conf
+#
+#   HOST*  — hostnames used to build the partner list via detect_hosts()
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # RUNTIME MODES
@@ -73,6 +143,14 @@ for arg in "$@"; do
     esac
 done
 parse_args "${FILTERED_ARGS[@]}"
+
+if [[ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
+    error "Must be run as root"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+acquire_lock
+
 detect_hosts
 require_partnership
 
@@ -105,7 +183,10 @@ _remote_scripts_dir() {
 
 # ── Ensure cache dir exists ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
 if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == false ]]; then
-    mkdir -p "$CACHE_DIR"
+    # These conf files carry credentials (NPM/lldap passwords, API keys). The cache lives in
+    # a world-readable /tmp path, so the directory and every file written into it below are
+    # restricted explicitly rather than left at the default umask.
+    mkdir -p "$CACHE_DIR" && chmod 700 "$CACHE_DIR"
 fi
 
 # ── Copy own conf into local cache ───────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -114,8 +195,12 @@ if [[ "$PUSH_ONLY" == false ]] && [[ "$PULL_ONLY" == false ]]; then
         if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]]; then
             warn "DRY RUN — would copy $(basename "$MY_CONF") → $CACHE_DIR/"
         else
-            cp "$MY_CONF" "$CACHE_DIR/${MY_ID,,}.conf" && \
-                echo "Own conf cached ✅" || warn "Failed to cache own conf"
+            if cp "$MY_CONF" "$CACHE_DIR/${MY_ID,,}.conf" && \
+               chmod 600 "$CACHE_DIR/${MY_ID,,}.conf"; then
+                echo "Own conf cached ✅"
+            else
+                warn "Failed to cache own conf"
+            fi
         fi
     else
         warn "Own conf not found: $MY_CONF"
@@ -151,6 +236,7 @@ for host_var in $(compgen -v | grep -E '^HOST[0-9]+$' | sort); do
             -o ConnectTimeout="$SSH_TIMEOUT" -o BatchMode=yes -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \
             "root@${partner_ip}:${remote_conf}" \
             "$CACHE_DIR/${partner_slot}.conf" 2>/dev/null; then
+            chmod 600 "$CACHE_DIR/${partner_slot}.conf" 2>/dev/null
             echo "Pulled ${partner_slot}.conf from $partner_host ✅"
             (( PULLED++ ))
         else
@@ -172,12 +258,16 @@ for host_var in $(compgen -v | grep -E '^HOST[0-9]+$' | sort); do
     # Ensure partner's cache dir exists, then SCP own conf into it
     timeout "$SSH_TIMEOUT" ssh -i "$SSH_KEY" \
         -o ConnectTimeout="$SSH_TIMEOUT" -o BatchMode=yes -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \
-        "root@${partner_ip}" "mkdir -p '$CACHE_DIR'" 2>/dev/null
+        "root@${partner_ip}" "mkdir -p '$CACHE_DIR' && chmod 700 '$CACHE_DIR'" 2>/dev/null
 
     if timeout "$SSH_TIMEOUT" scp -i "$SSH_KEY" \
         -o ConnectTimeout="$SSH_TIMEOUT" -o BatchMode=yes -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \
         "$MY_CONF" \
         "root@${partner_ip}:${CACHE_DIR}/${MY_ID,,}.conf" 2>/dev/null; then
+        # Our own conf lands on the partner carrying our credentials — restrict it there too.
+        timeout "$SSH_TIMEOUT" ssh -i "$SSH_KEY" \
+            -o ConnectTimeout="$SSH_TIMEOUT" -o BatchMode=yes -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \
+            "root@${partner_ip}" "chmod 600 '${CACHE_DIR}/${MY_ID,,}.conf'" 2>/dev/null
         echo "Pushed ${MY_ID,,}.conf to $partner_host ✅"
         (( PUSHED++ ))
     else

System_Essentials/docker_syslog_filter.sh

@@ -16,6 +16,19 @@
 # completely masking real events.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+#   1. Build the expected rsyslog filter content
+#   2. Compare against the file already on disk
+#        identical → exit silently, no write, no rsyslog restart
+#        missing or different → write the filter, then restart rsyslog
+#   3. Verify rsyslog came back up after the restart
+#
+# Runs before any container starts, so the first wave of veth messages at array
+# start is already being filtered.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #

System_Essentials/inotify_tuning.sh

@@ -14,6 +14,26 @@
 # starts requires a docker restart to pick up the new values.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# For each of the three limits (instances, watches, queued events):
+#
+#   1. Read the current kernel value via sysctl -n
+#   2. Compare against the configured target
+#        exactly equal → skip, nothing to do
+#        anything else → apply via sysctl -w
+#
+# Note this enforces the configured value exactly, in both directions: a limit currently
+# set HIGHER than the target is lowered back to it. That is deliberate — the conf is the
+# single declared source of truth for these limits — but it means raising a limit by hand
+# will be silently undone at the next array start. Raise the target in master.conf instead.
+#
+# Applied at every array start because these are runtime kernel settings that do not
+# survive a reboot, and must land before containers launch — a container inherits the
+# limits in force at its start, not dynamically.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #

System_Essentials/rsync_stop.sh

@@ -40,6 +40,35 @@
 #   If remote unreachable → skips remote cleanly, logs warning.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Stop the Transfer, Not the Schedule
+#   The default mode kills only the rsync subprocess and lets the orchestrator notice
+#   the exit and wind down on its own. Killing the orchestrator too would abandon the
+#   remaining shares silently; letting it finish its own loop keeps the schedule honest
+#   about what ran and what did not.
+#
+# Exact-Name Process Matching
+#   Targets are found with pgrep -x rsync — exact process name, never a pattern match
+#   against a command line. A loose pattern on a box running arbitrary containers could
+#   match something that merely mentions rsync in its arguments.
+#
+# Liveness Checked Before Every Signal
+#   kill -0 confirms a PID is still alive immediately before signalling it. PIDs are
+#   reused, and a transfer that exited on its own between discovery and signalling must
+#   not have its number sent a kill.
+#
+# Interrupting Is Safe by Construction
+#   rsync runs with --partial, so a killed transfer resumes rather than restarting.
+#   That is what makes stopping mid-sync a routine operation rather than a costly one.
+#
+# Clean Up What the Interruption Left
+#   A killed rsync leaves its lock file behind and may leave profile containers stopped.
+#   Both are cleared afterwards, so the next scheduled run is not blocked by a lock
+#   whose owner no longer exists.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -61,6 +90,31 @@
 #   Remote containers deferred to docker_watchdog.sh.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# CONFIGURATION
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# master.conf
+#
+#   LOCK_DIR
+#       Directory holding rsync and orchestrator lock files. Scanned after a kill to
+#       clear locks whose owning PID is gone.
+#
+#   DOCKER_TIMEOUT
+#       Timeout applied to the docker calls used when recovering containers a killed
+#       rsync left stopped.
+#
+#   PROFILE_CRITICAL_CONTAINER_NAMES
+#       Per-profile container lists — used to work out which containers an interrupted
+#       profile sync had stopped and therefore needs restarting.
+#
+#   SSH_KEY / SSH timeouts
+#       Used to reach the partner when stopping its rsync as well.
+#
+# host*.conf
+#
+#   HOST*  — resolved via detect_hosts() for MY_ID and remote routing
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # RUNTIME MODES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #

System_Essentials/server_reboot.sh

@@ -37,6 +37,31 @@
 #   After REBOOT_VM_WAIT seconds, libvirt stops anyway — reboot takes priority.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Warn, Do Not Block
+#   Pre-flight reports what is in flight — rsync running, mover running — and proceeds
+#   anyway. This is an operator-invoked tool: the person running it has already decided
+#   to reboot, and refusing would just push them to /sbin/reboot with no warning, no
+#   wall message and no clean array stop. The warnings name the specific script to run
+#   first (rsync_stop.sh, mover_stop.sh) so the safer path is the obvious one.
+#
+# Announce Before Acting
+#   A wall message and a notification go out REBOOT_SLEEP seconds ahead, both naming
+#   which host is rebooting and why. On a two-server setup "the server is rebooting" is
+#   ambiguous and therefore useless.
+#
+# Clean Array Stop First
+#   The reboot routes through the normal array stop sequence rather than calling
+#   /sbin/reboot directly. Array stop failures are reported and the reboot continues —
+#   an already-committed reboot should not be abandoned halfway, leaving services down
+#   and the machine still up.
+#
+# Flush Before Cutting Power
+#   sync runs immediately before /sbin/reboot so buffered writes reach disk.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #

Tools/arr_profile_enforcer.sh

@@ -18,6 +18,41 @@
 # do not need to be hardcoded and work across hosts.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Sonarr then Radarr, each independently:
+#
+#   1. Fetch quality profiles and resolve the configured names to live IDs
+#   2. Fetch the library
+#   3. Per item, derive the expected profile from its rootFolderPath
+#        contains "kids" or "anime" → kids profile
+#        anything else              → default profile
+#   4. Compare against the item's current profile
+#        already correct → skip, no call made
+#        wrong           → queue for the bulk editor PUT
+#   5. Issue the change and report counts
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Resolve Profile IDs at Runtime
+#   Profiles are looked up by name from the API on every run rather than hardcoding IDs.
+#   Profile IDs differ between hosts and change when profiles are recreated; a stale
+#   hardcoded ID would silently assign the wrong profile rather than failing.
+#
+# Change Only What Is Wrong
+#   Items already on the correct profile are never touched. That makes the tool safe to
+#   re-run at any time and keeps the reported count meaningful — a non-zero result means
+#   real drift, not just "it ran".
+#
+# Root Folder Is the Source of Truth
+#   Classification comes from where the item actually lives, not from its metadata. The
+#   classification scans own the harder question of whether an item is in the right root;
+#   this tool just makes the profile agree with the answer already on disk.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -69,6 +104,21 @@ done
 SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../load_config.sh"
 parse_args "$@"
+
+# ==============================================================================================
+# ━━━ Setup ━━━
+# ==============================================================================================
+# Consistent with the rest of Arrs_Stack/ and Tools/ — this issues bulk profile PUTs against
+# the arrs and should not be runnable by an unprivileged account that happens to hold a key.
+if [[ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
+    error "Must be run as root"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+# Bulk PUTs against the same items — two concurrent runs could interleave and leave a subset
+# of series/movies on the wrong profile.
+acquire_lock
+
 detect_hosts
 
 KIDS_PROFILE_NAME="${ARR_KIDS_PROFILE_NAME:-Kids shows}"

Tools/arr_rescan_monitor.sh

@@ -19,6 +19,58 @@
 # this for scans it triggers itself; this tool covers everything else.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+#   1. Validate the arr type and resolve its URL / API key / API version
+#   2. Poll /command for any active rescan-type command (ARR_RESCAN_COMMANDS)
+#        none active → nothing to watch, exit cleanly
+#   3. Wait for it to leave the active state, bounded by the timeout argument
+#        (default 7200s — a full-library scan is slow by nature)
+#   4. Once finished, fetch the library and arr_cache_write() the real numbers
+#
+# Triggers nothing. It only watches a scan someone or something else started.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Watch, Never Trigger
+#   This tool deliberately starts nothing. Its whole job is to be the thing that notices a
+#   scan finished, so a rescan begun by hand, by the arr's own UI, or by another script
+#   still gets its result written through to the shared cache.
+#
+# Complement to the Write Guard
+#   arr_cache_write() refuses to write while a rescan is active, because a mid-scan snapshot
+#   reads as real data loss to consumers like check_tracked_count_floor. That guard protects
+#   the cache but leaves nobody to write the true number afterwards. arr_full_rescan.sh
+#   covers the scans it starts itself; this covers every other origin.
+#
+# Bounded Wait
+#   The wait is capped by the timeout argument, so a scan that stalls or never reports
+#   completion cannot leave this running indefinitely holding its lock.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# CONFIGURATION
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# host*.conf (aliased by detect_hosts())
+#
+#   SONARR_URL / SONARR_API_KEY
+#   RADARR_URL / RADARR_API_KEY
+#   LIDARR_URL / LIDARR_API_KEY
+#       Connection details for whichever arr is passed as the first argument.
+#
+# common.sh
+#
+#   ARR_RESCAN_COMMANDS
+#       Command names treated as a rescan for this purpose — shared with
+#       arr_cache_write()'s own active-scan guard so both agree on what counts.
+#
+#   ARR_API_VERSION
+#       Per-arr API version map (v3 for Sonarr/Radarr, v1 for Lidarr).
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -59,6 +111,10 @@ if [[ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
     exit 1
 fi
 
+# This writes the shared tracked-data cache on completion. Two monitors watching the same
+# arr would both write it, and the loser's stale snapshot could land last.
+acquire_lock
+
 detect_hosts
 
 ARR_TYPE="${PARSED_ARGS[0]:-}"

Tools/bulk_permissions_repair.sh

@@ -23,9 +23,32 @@
 # repairs this tool is meant for — worth remembering before pointing it at an entire share.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# For each path given on the command line:
+#
+#   1. Path guard — refuse anything shallower than two components
+#   2. Existence check — a missing path is a failure for that entry, not the run
+#   3. Report scale — file count, dir count, total size, so the operator sees the job size
+#   4. Count entries with wrong ownership (the diagnostic number in the summary)
+#   5. chown -R PERMISSIONS_OWNER across the path
+#   6. find -type d → chmod PERMISSIONS_DIR_MODE
+#   7. find -type f → chmod PERMISSIONS_FILE_MODE
+#
+# Unlike the nightly media_shares_permissions.sh, steps 5–7 are unconditional — see the
+# ctime note in PURPOSE above for why that distinction matters.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
+# Unconditional by Design, Unlike the Nightly Job
+#   media_shares_permissions.sh applies its passes conditionally to protect ctime as an
+#   age signal for arr orphan collection. This tool deliberately does not: it exists to
+#   repair paths that are known-wrong, where correctness matters more than preserving a
+#   clock. That is exactly why it is a targeted manual tool and not a scheduled one.
+#
 # Permissions Model
 #   Directories (PERMISSIONS_DIR_MODE, default 755):
 #     Owner (nobody) — rwx  enter, list, create files
@@ -53,9 +76,6 @@
 #   Each path is verified before processing — missing paths log an error and
 #   are skipped rather than silently passing.
 #
-# Notification Validated
-#   platform_require_cmd confirms the notify script is present before use.
-#
 # Silent on Success
 #   Only failures and the wrong-owner diagnostic produce visible output.
 #
@@ -137,6 +157,18 @@ for share_path in "${PARSED_ARGS[@]}"; do
     echo ""
     echo "━━━ $ICON_PERMS $(basename "$share_path") ━━━"
 
+    # chown -R below. Paths come straight from the command line, so a spacing typo
+    # ("/mnt/user /Movies" instead of "/mnt/user/Movies") would hand this a bare top-level
+    # directory — and chown -R nobody:users on / or /etc breaks the system outright.
+    # Require at least two path components; that still allows a deliberate whole-share
+    # repair like /mnt/user while refusing /, /mnt, /etc, /boot and friends.
+    _bpr_slashes="${share_path//[^\/]/}"
+    if [[ "$share_path" != /* || "${#_bpr_slashes}" -lt 2 ]]; then
+        error "$share_path — refusing: expected an absolute path at least 2 levels deep"
+        FAIL+=("$share_path")
+        continue
+    fi
+
     if [[ ! -d "$share_path" ]]; then
         error "$share_path — not found"
         FAIL+=("$share_path")

Tools/container_data_export.sh

@@ -13,6 +13,37 @@
 # Output: ContainerName_YYYY-MM-DD_HH-MM.tar.gz — timestamped, no overwrite.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+#   1. Validate arguments — container name, appdata path, output directory all required
+#   2. Verify the output directory exists and holds enough free space for the archive
+#   3. Record whether the container is currently running
+#   4. Stop the container if it was running
+#   5. tar czf the appdata directory to a timestamped archive
+#   6. Verify the archive with tar --test-file
+#   7. Restart the container only if it was running before — a container found stopped
+#      stays stopped
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# CONFIGURATION
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# This tool takes everything as arguments rather than from conf:
+#
+#   <container>    Container to stop for the duration of the export
+#   <appdata_path> Directory to archive
+#   <output_dir>   Destination for the archive — must already exist
+#
+# That is deliberate. It is used for one-off exports of arbitrary containers, including
+# ones being removed from the stack entirely, so there is no meaningful configured list
+# to draw from and nothing host-specific to alias.
+#
+# Note the archive is written as root and is not chowned afterwards. That is fine for the
+# operator-invoked use this tool is for, but worth knowing if the output directory is a
+# user share reached over SMB.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -46,9 +77,6 @@
 #   DOCKER_TIMEOUT (default: 30s) caps all docker calls. Guards against a hung
 #   daemon blocking the script indefinitely.
 #
-# Notification Validated
-#   platform_require_cmd confirms the notify script is present before use.
-#
 # ==============================================================================================
 # RUNTIME MODES
 # ==============================================================================================

Tools/docker_prune_images.sh

@@ -30,13 +30,60 @@
 #   that may be intentionally paused.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Default (dangling only):
+#   docker image prune -f — removes untagged, unreferenced images only. Every tagged
+#   image survives, running containers are untouched, and nothing stopped is removed.
+#
+# --all (full orphan cleanup):
+#   1. Remove containers in exited/created state
+#   2. Remove every image not used by a RUNNING container
+#   Step 1 is what makes step 2 reach further: with the stopped containers gone, their
+#   images are no longer referenced and become eligible. That is also precisely why
+#   --all is destructive to anything deliberately kept stopped.
+#
+# Reclaimed space is reported for both modes.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# CONFIGURATION
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# This tool is deliberately unconfigured — it reads live Docker state rather than any
+# configured list, so there is nothing host-specific to alias and no thresholds to tune.
+# Scope is controlled entirely by the mode flag (default vs --all).
+#
+# Note it does not call detect_hosts(): nothing here is host-specific, and it acts only on
+# the local daemon.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   Root check   — Docker prune operations require root
-#   acquire_lock — prevents concurrent prune runs
-#   --dry-run    — shows what would be removed without taking any action
-#   --status     — lists current dangling images and stopped containers; no changes
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Docker prune operations require root.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock prevents concurrent prune runs racing on the same image store.
+#
+# Dangling-Only Default
+#   The default mode removes untagged, unreferenced images only. Reaching anything
+#   tagged, running, or deliberately stopped requires --all explicitly — the safe
+#   behaviour is what you get by not thinking about it.
+#
+# Running Containers Never Touched
+#   Neither mode removes a running container or an image a running container uses.
+#   --all widens the blast radius to STOPPED containers and their images, never to
+#   anything currently up.
+#
+# Dry Run Support
+#   --dry-run lists everything that would be removed and removes nothing. Worth using
+#   before --all specifically, since that mode deletes intentionally-stopped containers.
+#
+# Status Mode
+#   --status lists current dangling images and stopped containers without changing
+#   anything, so the scope of a prospective --all is visible up front.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # RUNTIME MODES

Tools/emby_database_repair.sh

@@ -29,6 +29,28 @@
 # Emby's config path is detected from the Docker mount — no hardcoded paths.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Diagnose, Never Repair
+#   The script reports which databases fail integrity_check and stops there. SQLite
+#   "repair" means dumping and rebuilding, which silently discards whatever rows were
+#   corrupt — an outcome nobody should get without deciding to. The remediation steps
+#   are printed instead, for a human to run against a backup.
+#
+# Stop Emby Before Reading
+#   integrity_check against a live database gives unreliable answers and can itself
+#   contend with Emby's writes. Emby is stopped for the duration and restarted after,
+#   so the check runs against a quiescent file.
+#
+# Always Restart, Even on Failure
+#   Emby is brought back up regardless of what the check found, and an EXIT trap armed
+#   before it is stopped restores it even if this script dies partway through. It is
+#   disarmed only once the normal restart has run. Leaving the media server down because
+#   a diagnostic reported a problem turns an investigation into an outage — and the
+#   original running state is honoured, so an Emby that was already stopped stays stopped.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #

Tools/emby_to_lidarr_sync.sh

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 # fetch as fallback.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
-# FLOW
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
 #   1. Pull play completions from Emby activity log (all time, or --days N)
@@ -25,6 +25,29 @@
 #   3. For each played artist not in Lidarr → add to Lidarr
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Add-Only, Never Remove
+#   The tool only adds artists the arr is missing. It never deletes or unmonitors anything,
+#   so the worst outcome of a bad match is an extra tracked entry — trivially reversible —
+#   rather than lost tracking on something already curated.
+#
+# Library Membership Is the Whole Criterion
+#   No scoring, no thresholds, no metadata quality gates. If it is in Emby, the arr should
+#   know about it. This is deliberately not a discovery tool; the playback_aware_* scripts
+#   own that job and its judgement calls.
+#
+# Provider ID Over Title
+#   Matching prefers the MusicBrainz ID and falls back to case-insensitive title only when the ID
+#   is absent. Titles differ across sources by punctuation, year suffixes and articles;
+#   matching on them alone would re-add things the arr already tracks.
+#
+# Cache-First Read
+#   The arr library comes from the shared tracked-data cache, kept warm by
+#   arr_cache_prefill.sh, with a live fetch as fallback. One read regardless of library size.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -40,7 +63,7 @@
 #   modification. Safe to run multiple times — the second run finds nothing to add.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
-# CONFIGURATION (host*.conf)
+# CONFIGURATION
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
 #   HOST*_LIDARR_URL / HOST*_LIDARR_API_KEY    — Lidarr connection (aliased by detect_hosts)

Tools/emby_to_radarr_sync.sh

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 # fetch as fallback.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
-# FLOW
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
 #   1. Fetch all Movie items from Emby (with TMDB provider IDs)
@@ -27,6 +27,29 @@
 # falling back to case-insensitive title comparison.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Add-Only, Never Remove
+#   The tool only adds movies the arr is missing. It never deletes or unmonitors anything,
+#   so the worst outcome of a bad match is an extra tracked entry — trivially reversible —
+#   rather than lost tracking on something already curated.
+#
+# Library Membership Is the Whole Criterion
+#   No scoring, no thresholds, no metadata quality gates. If it is in Emby, the arr should
+#   know about it. This is deliberately not a discovery tool; the playback_aware_* scripts
+#   own that job and its judgement calls.
+#
+# Provider ID Over Title
+#   Matching prefers the TMDB ID and falls back to case-insensitive title only when the ID
+#   is absent. Titles differ across sources by punctuation, year suffixes and articles;
+#   matching on them alone would re-add things the arr already tracks.
+#
+# Cache-First Read
+#   The arr library comes from the shared tracked-data cache, kept warm by
+#   arr_cache_prefill.sh, with a live fetch as fallback. One read regardless of library size.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -42,7 +65,7 @@
 #   without modification. Safe to run multiple times — the second run finds nothing to add.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
-# CONFIGURATION (master.conf / host*.conf)
+# CONFIGURATION
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
 #   RADARR_EMBY_LIBRARIES                      — Emby library names to scan (master.conf); empty = all libraries

Tools/emby_to_sonarr_sync.sh

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 # fetch as fallback.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
-# FLOW
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
 #   1. Fetch all Series items from Emby (with TVDB provider IDs)
@@ -27,6 +27,29 @@
 # falling back to case-insensitive title comparison.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Add-Only, Never Remove
+#   The tool only adds series the arr is missing. It never deletes or unmonitors anything,
+#   so the worst outcome of a bad match is an extra tracked entry — trivially reversible —
+#   rather than lost tracking on something already curated.
+#
+# Library Membership Is the Whole Criterion
+#   No scoring, no thresholds, no metadata quality gates. If it is in Emby, the arr should
+#   know about it. This is deliberately not a discovery tool; the playback_aware_* scripts
+#   own that job and its judgement calls.
+#
+# Provider ID Over Title
+#   Matching prefers the TVDB ID and falls back to case-insensitive title only when the ID
+#   is absent. Titles differ across sources by punctuation, year suffixes and articles;
+#   matching on them alone would re-add things the arr already tracks.
+#
+# Cache-First Read
+#   The arr library comes from the shared tracked-data cache, kept warm by
+#   arr_cache_prefill.sh, with a live fetch as fallback. One read regardless of library size.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -42,7 +65,7 @@
 #   without modification. Safe to run multiple times — the second run finds nothing to add.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
-# CONFIGURATION (master.conf / host*.conf)
+# CONFIGURATION
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
 #   SONARR_EMBY_LIBRARIES                      — Emby library names to scan (master.conf); empty = all libraries

Tools/fallback_state_reset.sh

@@ -22,6 +22,49 @@
 # covering the remote server until the next detection cycle.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+#   1. Read and display the current state file so the operator sees what is being discarded
+#   2. Write a fresh state file:
+#        state=NORMAL, fallback_start=0, handback_strikes=0
+#        tier2_started=false, tier3_started=false, tier4_started=false
+#   3. Report the new state
+#
+# Nothing else is touched. No container is started or stopped, no DDNS is moved, no rsync
+# is run. fallback.sh picks the new state up on its next cycle and proceeds from NORMAL.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# State File Only, Never Containers
+#   This tool changes what fallback.sh believes, not what is actually running. That
+#   separation is the point: reconciling the real stack is an operator judgement call,
+#   and a tool that tried to do both could act on a belief that was already wrong.
+#
+# The Operator Asserts Reality
+#   Resetting to NORMAL is a claim that the stack really is normal — right containers on
+#   the right host, DDNS pointing the right way. The script cannot verify that, so it
+#   shows the current state before overwriting it and leaves the check to the human. If
+#   the assertion is wrong, fallback.sh will act on a false NORMAL.
+#
+# Full Reset, Not Partial Edit
+#   Every field is rewritten rather than patching individual keys. A partially-reset file
+#   — NORMAL state with tier flags still true — is a state fallback.sh has no handling
+#   for and would be worse than either extreme.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# CONFIGURATION
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# master.conf
+#
+#   FALLBACK_STATE_FILE
+#       Path to the fallback state file this tool rewrites. Shared with fallback.sh —
+#       both must agree or the reset writes somewhere fallback.sh never reads.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -40,9 +83,6 @@
 #   Interactive mode prompts for YES before writing. Use --force to bypass in
 #   non-interactive contexts (cron, scripts).
 #
-# Notification Validated
-#   platform_require_cmd confirms the notify script is present before use.
-#
 # ==============================================================================================
 # RUNTIME MODES
 # ==============================================================================================

Tools/ramdisk_stop.sh

@@ -30,6 +30,31 @@
 # lost on unmount — warn the user but proceed (this is expected for maintenance).
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Redirect Before Unmounting
+#   The symlink is pointed at the SSD fallback first, and only then is the tmpfs
+#   unmounted. Reversing that order would leave in-flight transcodes writing into a
+#   path that is being pulled out from under them. New sessions land on SSD from the
+#   moment of the flip; existing ones drain.
+#
+# Unmount Is the Data Loss
+#   Everything on a tmpfs disappears when it is unmounted — there is nothing to migrate
+#   and no way to preserve it. That is acceptable only because the contents are
+#   regenerable transcode segments, which is exactly why this operation is safe for
+#   transcodes and would not be for any other kind of ramdisk.
+#
+# Not Mounted Is Success
+#   An already-unmounted ramdisk is reported and treated as done, not as an error. The
+#   goal state is "ramdisk not mounted", and the script is idempotent toward it.
+#
+# State File Reflects Reality
+#   The transcode state file is updated to record the SSD target, so transcode_manager.sh
+#   agrees with what actually happened rather than trying to flip back to a ramdisk that
+#   no longer exists.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #

Tools/smart_long_test.sh

@@ -31,6 +31,29 @@
 #   NVMe any    :  5–10 min
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Read-Only Diagnostic
+#   A SMART self-test is executed by the drive's own firmware and writes nothing to the
+#   filesystem. The array stays fully online and in use throughout; the only cost is
+#   background I/O contention while the drive read-scans itself.
+#
+# Full Scan, Not the Short Test
+#   The extended test reads every sector. The short test samples, and a bad sector in
+#   the unsampled region is exactly the kind of latent fault that only surfaces when
+#   something tries to read it — often during a rebuild, when redundancy is already gone.
+#
+# Per-Drive Isolation
+#   A drive that fails to start a test, does not support one, or reports an error never
+#   prevents the remaining drives from being tested. Partial coverage beats none.
+#
+# Report, Do Not Act
+#   Results are reported and notified; nothing is disabled, replaced or rebuilt on the
+#   basis of a failed test. Acting on a drive is a hardware decision with cost and
+#   downtime attached, and belongs to the operator.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #

Tools/trailer_folder_migration.sh

@@ -41,6 +41,64 @@
 #   safely after a partial run or a manually resolved conflict.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Move, Never Copy or Delete
+#   Files are relocated with mv and nothing is ever removed. A misjudged move is
+#   reversible by hand; a delete is not. The script has no cleanup pass by design.
+#
+# Idempotent by Collision Skip
+#   Re-running is safe because an existing destination is skipped rather than
+#   overwritten. A partial run, an interrupted run, or a manually resolved conflict
+#   can all be followed by a plain re-run.
+#
+# Deterministic Ordering
+#   Multiple trailers per show are sorted before numbering, so the same input always
+#   produces the same trailer.ext / trailer-2.ext assignment. Without the sort, the
+#   numbering would depend on filesystem iteration order and a re-run could rename
+#   files differently.
+#
+# Filesystem Only
+#   Neither Trailarr nor Emby is touched. Emby's periodic library scan picks the moved
+#   files up on its own — poking either service would add failure modes to what is
+#   otherwise a pure file move.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Moves files owned by container users and chowns the created trailers/ directory.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock prevents two runs numbering the same show's trailers concurrently.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() aliases HOST*_SONARR_TV_ROOT → SONARR_TV_ROOT.
+#
+# TV Root Validation
+#   Exits if SONARR_TV_ROOT is unset or is not a directory — the scan below is rooted
+#   there, and an empty value would walk from the current directory.
+#
+# Bounded Scan Depth
+#   find runs with -mindepth 2 -maxdepth 2, so only files sitting directly in a series
+#   folder are considered. Trailers already correctly placed inside trailers/ are out
+#   of range and cannot be picked up and re-moved.
+#
+# Collision Skip
+#   An existing destination is never overwritten — the source is left in place and
+#   counted as a conflict for review.
+#
+# Permission Matching on Created Directories
+#   mkdir as root would leave trailers/ as root-owned. It is chowned to
+#   PERMISSIONS_OWNER and chmodded to PERMISSIONS_DIR_MODE so it matches the rest of
+#   the library and does not become an exception the permissions job has to correct.
+#
+# Dry Run Support
+#   --dry-run reports every move and touches nothing.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -50,6 +108,12 @@
 #       Host filesystem path to the TV library. Aliased by detect_hosts() →
 #       SONARR_TV_ROOT.
 #
+# master.conf
+#
+#   PERMISSIONS_OWNER / PERMISSIONS_DIR_MODE
+#       Applied to each created trailers/ directory so it matches library convention.
+#       Shared with media_shares_permissions.sh. (defaults: nobody:users, 755)
+#
 # ==============================================================================================
 # RUNTIME MODES
 # ==============================================================================================
@@ -74,6 +138,12 @@ parse_args "$@"
 # ==============================================================================================
 # ━━━ Setup ━━━
 # ==============================================================================================
+# Moves container-owned media files and chowns the trailers/ dirs it creates.
+if [[ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
+    error "Must be run as root"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
 acquire_lock
 
 # detect_hosts() sets MY_ID and aliases HOST*_SONARR_TV_ROOT → SONARR_TV_ROOT

Tools/watchdog_skip_list_manager.sh

@@ -28,6 +28,45 @@
 #   4. Watchdog monitors normally on next cycle. If it crashes again → re-added.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Clearing Is an Assertion, Not a Fix
+#   Removing a container from the skip list tells docker_watchdog.sh to start restarting
+#   it again. It does nothing about why the container was crash-looping. Clearing before
+#   the underlying fault is fixed just restarts the loop that put it there.
+#
+# The Skip List Is Protection, Not Punishment
+#   A container lands here because restarting it repeatedly was making things worse, not
+#   better. The entry exists so the watchdog stops burning cycles and notifications on
+#   something only a human can fix.
+#
+# Persistent by Design
+#   The list lives on /boot/config and survives reboots deliberately. A crash loop that
+#   a reboot would clear is exactly the case where the watchdog would resume looping
+#   after the reboot — persistence is what stops that.
+#
+# Auto-Clear Is the Normal Path
+#   docker_watchdog.sh removes a container from the list on its own once it sees it
+#   running healthily. This tool is for the case where you have fixed the problem and
+#   do not want to wait for that, not the routine way entries leave the list.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# CONFIGURATION
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# master.conf
+#
+#   DOCKER_WATCHDOG_FAILED_FILE
+#       Persistent skip list on /boot/config, shared with docker_watchdog.sh. Both must
+#       agree on the path or the watchdog will not see what this tool changes.
+#
+#   WATCHDOG_CONTAINER_RESTART_LIMIT / WATCHDOG_CONTAINER_RESTART_WINDOW
+#       The thresholds docker_watchdog.sh uses to decide a container belongs on the list.
+#       Shown here for context — this tool does not apply them, it only views and edits
+#       the resulting list.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #

Tools/webhook_setup.sh

@@ -43,6 +43,34 @@
 #   acquire_lock    — prevents concurrent registration runs
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# CONFIGURATION
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# master.conf
+#
+#   WEBHOOK_PORT
+#       Port the listener binds and the registered webhook URL points at. 0 disables the
+#       listener entirely (start_webhook_listener.sh exits early), so registering against
+#       a port of 0 would produce URLs nothing is serving.
+#
+#   WEBHOOK_SECRET
+#       Shared secret embedded in the registered URL as ?key=. Generated here on first run
+#       and written back into master.conf — the write-back is verified, because the arrs
+#       are registered with this value and a failed persist would leave them holding a
+#       secret this host does not have.
+#
+# host*.conf (aliased by detect_hosts())
+#
+#   SONARR_URL / SONARR_API_KEY
+#   RADARR_URL / RADARR_API_KEY
+#   LIDARR_URL / LIDARR_API_KEY
+#       Each arr the webhook is registered in. An arr with no URL or key configured on
+#       this host is skipped rather than failing the run.
+#
+#   SSH_KEY
+#       Used when propagating the same secret to the partner via OVERRIDE_SECRET.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # RUNTIME MODES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -76,6 +104,13 @@ MASTER_CONF="$ECOSYSTEM_ROOT/Configurations/master.conf"
 
 source "$ECOSYSTEM_ROOT/load_config.sh"
 parse_args "$@"
+
+# Writes the generated secret into master.conf via sed -i and SSHes to the partner.
+if [[ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
+    error "Must be run as root"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
 acquire_lock
 detect_hosts
 
@@ -84,9 +119,25 @@ WEBHOOK_NAME="Varaverk Upgrade"
 # ── Resolve or generate the secret ──────────────────────────────────────────
 # OVERRIDE_SECRET env var is set when called recursively via SSH from the
 # primary host, so both ends use the same secret.
+#
+# Every write-back below is verified by re-reading master.conf. The secret gets baked into
+# the webhook URL registered in each arr — if the sed silently fails to match, the arrs end
+# up holding a secret this host does not have, and the listener rejects every delivery.
+_persist_secret() {
+    local secret="$1"
+    sed -i "s/WEBHOOK_SECRET=\"\"/WEBHOOK_SECRET=\"$secret\"/" "$MASTER_CONF"
+    if ! grep -q "WEBHOOK_SECRET=\"$secret\"" "$MASTER_CONF" 2>/dev/null; then
+        error "Could not persist WEBHOOK_SECRET to $MASTER_CONF"
+        error "Registering the arrs now would leave them with a secret this host does not have"
+        notify "Webhook setup aborted on $(hostname) — could not persist WEBHOOK_SECRET" \
+            "Webhook Setup" "warning"
+        exit 1
+    fi
+}
+
 if [[ -n "${OVERRIDE_SECRET:-}" ]]; then
     if [[ -z "${WEBHOOK_SECRET:-}" ]]; then
-        sed -i "s/WEBHOOK_SECRET=\"\"/WEBHOOK_SECRET=\"$OVERRIDE_SECRET\"/" "$MASTER_CONF"
+        _persist_secret "$OVERRIDE_SECRET"
     fi
     WEBHOOK_SECRET="$OVERRIDE_SECRET"
 fi
@@ -95,8 +146,12 @@ if [[ -z "${WEBHOOK_SECRET:-}" ]]; then
     if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]]; then
         WEBHOOK_SECRET="<would-generate>"
     else
+        if ! command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            error "openssl not found — cannot generate WEBHOOK_SECRET"
+            exit 1
+        fi
         GENERATED=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
-        sed -i "s/WEBHOOK_SECRET=\"\"/WEBHOOK_SECRET=\"$GENERATED\"/" "$MASTER_CONF"
+        _persist_secret "$GENERATED"
         WEBHOOK_SECRET="$GENERATED"
         echo "Generated WEBHOOK_SECRET — saved to master.conf"
     fi

Tools/zfs_pool_scrub.sh

@@ -27,6 +27,33 @@
 # VM pools, temp pools, etc.). Specifying a pool by name bypasses the ignore list.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Scrub While Online
+#   A scrub runs against a live, in-use pool by design. Nothing is unmounted and no
+#   service is stopped — the cost is background I/O, not downtime, which is what makes
+#   monthly cadence practical at all.
+#
+# Detect Before Redundancy Is Gone
+#   Silent corruption otherwise surfaces only when the bad block is finally read, which
+#   is often during a resilver — precisely when the redundancy needed to repair it is
+#   already spent. Scrubbing is what moves that discovery to a moment when ZFS can still
+#   fix it from a good copy.
+#
+# Never Start a Second Scrub
+#   A pool already scrubbing is left alone rather than restarted. Restarting discards the
+#   progress of the run in flight and begins the whole read again.
+#
+# Per-Pool Isolation
+#   One pool failing, being unavailable, or already scrubbing never blocks the others.
+#
+# Report Errors, Repair Nothing by Hand
+#   ZFS self-heals from redundancy during the scrub. What this reports is what ZFS could
+#   not fix — those are operator decisions about hardware, not something a script should
+#   attempt to resolve.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #

Transcodes/ramdisk_setup.sh

@@ -30,6 +30,37 @@
 # /tmp resets on reboot — correct, transcode state should not persist across boots.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Size Is a Ceiling, Not a Reservation
+#   tmpfs allocates on write. RAMDISK_SIZE caps how large the ramdisk may grow; it does
+#   not take that RAM away from the system up front. Sizing it generously costs nothing
+#   until transcodes actually fill it, which is why the ceiling can sit well above
+#   normal usage without starving anything.
+#
+# Clean Symlink State Every Boot
+#   TRANSCODE_LINK is reset to the ramdisk at every array start rather than left wherever
+#   the last flip put it. transcode_manager.sh flips it to SSD under pressure, and that
+#   flip is a runtime response to a full ramdisk — carrying it across a reboot would mean
+#   starting on the fallback with an empty ramdisk sitting unused.
+#
+# Pre-Create Before Emby Starts
+#   transcoding-temp/ is created on the ramdisk before any container launches. Emby
+#   searches accessible paths for an existing transcoding-temp at startup and binds to
+#   the first it finds — if only the SSD copy exists, every session lands there until
+#   Emby is restarted. Ordering here is not cosmetic; it decides where transcodes go.
+#
+# Idempotent Re-Runs
+#   An already-mounted ramdisk is left mounted and only the symlink and permissions are
+#   verified. Re-running never tears down a mount that active sessions are writing into.
+#
+# State Belongs in /tmp
+#   The transcode state DB lives in /tmp and resets on reboot. Flip counters and the
+#   current target describe a running system; carrying them across a boot would make the
+#   manager act on pressure that no longer exists.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -43,9 +74,6 @@
 #   If RAMDISK_PATH is already a mountpoint, reports status and exits cleanly
 #   without attempting to remount or changing anything.
 #
-# Notification Validated
-#   platform_require_cmd confirms the notify script is present before use.
-#
 # Silent on Success
 #   Startup script runs on every boot — no output when healthy.
 #
@@ -127,6 +155,23 @@ acquire_lock
 # detect_hosts() sets MY_ID and aliases RAMDISK_SIZE, TRANSCODE_SSD etc.
 detect_hosts
 
+# This script mounts a tmpfs over RAMDISK_PATH and, when TRANSCODE_LINK exists but is not a
+# symlink, rm -rf's it before replacing it. Neither of those checks catches a collapsed path:
+# / and /mnt both satisfy -e, and mounting a tmpfs over a system directory hides its contents
+# for the life of the mount. Require at least two path components before either is touched.
+for _tc_pair in "RAMDISK_PATH:$RAMDISK_PATH" "TRANSCODE_LINK:$TRANSCODE_LINK"; do
+    _tc_name="${_tc_pair%%:*}"
+    _tc_path="${_tc_pair#*:}"
+    _tc_slashes="${_tc_path//[^\/]/}"
+    if [[ -z "$_tc_path" || "$_tc_path" != /* || "${#_tc_slashes}" -lt 2 ]]; then
+        error "$_tc_name is unset or unsafe ('${_tc_path:-unset}') — refusing to mount or relink"
+        notify "Ramdisk setup aborted on $(hostname) ($MY_ID) — $_tc_name is '${_tc_path:-unset}'" \
+            "Ramdisk Setup" "warning"
+        exit 1
+    fi
+done
+unset _tc_pair _tc_name _tc_path _tc_slashes
+
 log "Identity:  $MY_ID ($LOCAL_SERVER_NAME)"
 log "Ramdisk:   $RAMDISK_PATH ($RAMDISK_SIZE)"
 log "Fallback:  $TRANSCODE_SSD"

Transcodes/transcode_cleanup.sh

@@ -15,9 +15,41 @@
 #   2. Not currently open by any process (checked via lsof pre-built map)
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Two locations cleaned in sequence, each through the same routine:
+#
+#   Ramdisk       — only if mountpoint -q confirms it is actually mounted. An unmounted
+#                   ramdisk means the underlying directory is the real filesystem, and
+#                   cleaning it would delete from disk rather than from tmpfs.
+#   SSD fallback  — only if the directory exists.
+#
+# Per location:
+#   1. Path sanity check — refuse anything shallower than two components
+#   2. Count total and age-eligible files (-mmin +TRANSCODE_MAX_AGE)
+#   3. One lsof +D call → in-memory open-file map for the whole location
+#   4. Per eligible file: open → skip and count as active; otherwise rm -f
+#   5. Remove empty directories older than TRANSCODE_ORPHAN_AGE, never transcoding-temp
+#
+# Afterwards, if the ramdisk recovered enough headroom, the symlink is flipped back to
+# it so new sessions return to RAM.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
+# Two Independent Conditions, Both Required
+#   Age and open-file state are checked separately and a file must pass both. Age alone
+#   would delete a long-running session's segments; lsof alone cannot see HLS segments,
+#   which are written and closed atomically. Neither signal is sufficient on its own,
+#   which is exactly why both are applied rather than picking the better one.
+#
+# Mounted-Only Ramdisk Cleaning
+#   The ramdisk is only cleaned when it is genuinely mounted. If the tmpfs failed to
+#   mount, that same path is an ordinary directory on the array — cleaning it then would
+#   delete real files from disk while believing it was clearing RAM.
+#
 # lsof Called Once, Not Per File
 #   On a busy Live TV system the ramdisk contains thousands of HLS segment files.
 #   Calling lsof once per file creates thousands of subprocess calls every 7 minutes.
@@ -55,6 +87,13 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
+# Location Path Guard
+#   cleanup_location() refuses any path that is not absolute with at least two
+#   components. Neither caller's own check catches a collapsed value — mountpoint -q
+#   returns true for /, and -d is true for both / and /mnt — so the guard lives inside
+#   the function that does the deleting, covering both call sites.
+#
+#
 # Wait Lock
 #   acquire_lock "wait" — waits if a previous cleanup run is still active rather
 #   than exiting. The caller's 7-minute interval can overlap on a slow system.
@@ -188,6 +227,19 @@ cleanup_location() {
         return
     fi
 
+    # This function deletes every file under $location past the age gate. Neither caller's
+    # own check catches a collapsed path: mountpoint -q returns true for /, and -d is true
+    # for / and /mnt alike. Require at least two path components so a blank or truncated
+    # RAMDISK_PATH / TRANSCODE_SSD can never point this at a system directory.
+    local _loc_slashes="${location//[^\/]/}"
+    if [[ "$location" != /* || "${#_loc_slashes}" -lt 2 ]]; then
+        error "Refusing to clean unsafe location: '$location' ($label)"
+        notify "Transcode cleanup refused unsafe path on $(hostname): '$location'" \
+            "Transcode Cleanup" "warning"
+        LOCATION_REMOVED=0 LOCATION_FREED="0B" LOCATION_SKIPPED=0 LOCATION_ACTIVE=0 LOCATION_STREAMING=0 LOCATION_TOO_YOUNG=0 LOCATION_FAILED=0
+        return
+    fi
+
     local file_count eligible_count
     file_count=$(find "$location" -type f 2>/dev/null | wc -l)
     eligible_count=$(find "$location" -type f -mmin +"$max_age" 2>/dev/null | wc -l)

Transcodes/transcode_manager.sh

@@ -45,6 +45,36 @@
 #   Format: DATE|RAMDISK_USED_GB|FLIP_COUNT|RAM_SESSION_COUNT|SSD_SESSION_COUNT|FILES_CLEANED
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Flip the Destination, Never Move the Sessions
+#   Switching targets only repoints the symlink so NEW sessions land elsewhere. Existing
+#   transcodes keep writing to the path they opened and drain naturally. Moving files
+#   mid-transcode would break every stream currently playing, which is the opposite of
+#   what pressure relief is for.
+#
+# Asymmetric Thresholds
+#   Flipping away happens at RAMDISK_WARN_GB, flipping back at RAMDISK_LOW_GB — two
+#   separate values, not one. A single threshold would flip on every fluctuation around
+#   it; the gap between them is what makes the decision stable under load.
+#
+# Safety Checks Are Unconditional
+#   Symlink, ramdisk presence, SSD presence, transcoding-temp and permissions are all
+#   verified on every run in every mode, including the fixed ramdisk/ssd modes. Mode
+#   controls where transcodes go, not whether the plumbing gets checked.
+#
+# Degrade Toward the Fallback
+#   Every failure path resolves toward SSD, never toward an unusable target. A vanished
+#   ramdisk flips to SSD immediately rather than leaving sessions pointed at nothing —
+#   transcoding slower is recoverable, transcoding nowhere is not.
+#
+# Observe Without Emby
+#   With Emby down, threshold logic is skipped but the symlink is still verified. There
+#   is no session pressure to react to, and acting on stale usage would flip the target
+#   for sessions that no longer exist.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -55,9 +85,6 @@
 # Docker Timeout
 #   DOCKER_TIMEOUT caps all docker calls against a hung daemon.
 #
-# Notification Validated
-#   platform_require_cmd confirms the notify script is present before use.
-#
 # Silent by Default
 #   Runs every 7 minutes — only speaks when something changes or needs attention.
 #

Watchdogs/System/conf_cache_watchdog.sh

@@ -21,6 +21,25 @@
 # No-op when FALLBACK_ENABLED=false or CONF_SYNC_ENABLED=false.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL MODEL
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# One decision, driven entirely by remote reachability:
+#
+#   1. Gates
+#        → PARTNERSHIP_ENABLED, FALLBACK_ENABLED, CONF_SYNC_ENABLED, REMOTE_ID
+#        → any gate closed means exit 0, no work, no output
+#
+#   2. ping_remote
+#        REACHABLE   → remove $PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE if it exists, exit
+#        UNREACHABLE → refresh the backup from the RAM cache
+#
+#   3. Refresh (remote offline only)
+#        → copy every host*.conf from the RAM cache except this host's own
+#        → own conf is excluded: it is already on disk, the backup exists
+#          solely to survive a reboot without the partner's vars
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # DESIGN PRINCIPLES
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -38,11 +57,70 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   require_partnership        — exits early if PARTNERSHIP_ENABLED=false
-#   FALLBACK_ENABLED gate      — exits if fallback is disabled
-#   CONF_SYNC_ENABLED gate     — exits if conf sync is disabled
-#   REMOTE_ID presence check   — exits if partner identity is unset
-#   --dry-run mode             — shows what would happen without touching the backup
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Writes to and removes $PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE, which lives under the plugin
+#   directory and is not user-writable.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock() prevents concurrent execution. Without it a slow run can still
+#   be copying confs into the backup while the next run, seeing the remote back
+#   online, rm -rf's the directory out from under it.
+#
+# Cache Path Sanity Guard
+#   PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE is validated as an absolute path at least three levels
+#   deep before any rm -rf. It is built from ${SCRIPTS_DIR} — if that is ever
+#   unset the path collapses toward the filesystem root, and this script would
+#   otherwise recursively delete whatever it collapsed to.
+#
+# Partnership Gate
+#   require_partnership() exits early if PARTNERSHIP_ENABLED=false.
+#
+# FALLBACK_ENABLED / CONF_SYNC_ENABLED Gates
+#   Exits cleanly if either is disabled — the backup only has meaning when
+#   fallback can actually consume it.
+#
+# REMOTE_ID Presence Check
+#   Exits if partner identity is unset. Without a partner there is nothing to
+#   back up and the own-conf exclusion below could not be applied correctly.
+#
+# Own-Conf Exclusion
+#   This host's own conf is never written into the partner backup. Restoring it
+#   later would overwrite live local config with a stale copy.
+#
+# Dry Run Support
+#   --dry-run reports every removal and copy without touching the backup.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# CONFIGURATION
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# master.conf
+#
+#   PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE
+#       Destination for the partner conf backup. Must survive a reboot, so it
+#       lives under ${SCRIPTS_DIR}, not in /tmp.
+#
+#   FALLBACK_ENABLED
+#       Master fallback toggle. Backup is pointless when fallback cannot run.
+#
+#   CONF_SYNC_ENABLED
+#       Conf sync toggle. When off, no RAM cache is being maintained to back up.
+#
+#   PARTNERSHIP_ENABLED
+#       Checked via require_partnership().
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
+# RUNTIME MODES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# conf_cache_watchdog.sh
+#     Refresh or remove the persistent partner conf backup based on remote state
+#
+# conf_cache_watchdog.sh --dry-run
+#     Report what would be written or removed without changing the backup
+#
+# conf_cache_watchdog.sh --log
+#     Verbose per-file output
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 
@@ -50,6 +128,17 @@ SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 source "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../load_config.sh"
 
 parse_args "$@"
+
+# ==============================================================================================
+# ━━━ Setup ━━━
+# ==============================================================================================
+if [[ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]]; then
+    error "Must be run as root"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+acquire_lock
+
 detect_hosts
 require_partnership
 
@@ -58,7 +147,19 @@ require_partnership
 [[ -z "${REMOTE_ID:-}"         ]]            && exit 0
 
 RAM_CACHE="/tmp/.cache/vv/d"
-SAVE_DIR="$PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE"
+SAVE_DIR="${PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE:-}"
+
+# SAVE_DIR is rm -rf'd below and is built from ${SCRIPTS_DIR}. If that is ever unset the
+# path collapses toward / — require an absolute path at least three levels deep so a
+# collapsed or empty value can never name a system directory.
+_slashes="${SAVE_DIR//[^\/]/}"
+if [[ -z "$SAVE_DIR" || "$SAVE_DIR" != /* || "${#_slashes}" -lt 3 ]]; then
+    error "PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE is unset or unsafe ('${SAVE_DIR:-unset}') — refusing to manage conf backup"
+    notify "conf_cache_watchdog aborted on $(hostname) — PERSISTENT_CONF_CACHE is '${SAVE_DIR:-unset}'" \
+        "Conf Cache Watchdog" "warning"
+    exit 1
+fi
+unset _slashes
 
 if ping_remote; then
     if [[ -d "$SAVE_DIR" ]]; then

Watchdogs/System/storage_watchdog.sh

@@ -73,6 +73,63 @@
 #   attention.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Truncating container-owned log files requires root.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock() prevents concurrent runs. Two instances would race on the
+#   strike state file and the growth baseline, double-counting strikes and
+#   potentially truncating a file one cycle early.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() aliases HOST*_WATCHDOG_APPDATA_SIZES to the correct host's
+#   suppress ceilings.
+#
+# WATCHDOG_CHECK_APPDATA Toggle
+#   Exits cleanly before any scanning when the master toggle is off.
+#
+# Path Existence Guard
+#   Every entry in WATCHDOG_APPDATA_PATHS is skipped unless it is a non-empty
+#   string naming a real directory. An unconfigured array cannot cause a scan
+#   from an unintended location.
+#
+# Truncate-Never-Delete
+#   Action is always truncate -s 0, never rm. The container keeps its open file
+#   handle and space is reclaimed immediately, so a still-running service does
+#   not lose its log destination mid-write.
+#
+# Filename Restriction
+#   Only *.log and *.log.* files are ever truncation candidates. Databases,
+#   caches, game saves and every other growing file are alert-only — detected
+#   and reported, never modified.
+#
+# Truncation Opt-In
+#   WATCHDOG_APPDATA_TRUNCATE_LOGS defaults to false. Without it explicitly
+#   enabled the action cycle escalates to a critical notification and holds
+#   strikes rather than touching any file.
+#
+# Strike Threshold
+#   Nothing acts on first detection. WATCHDOG_APPDATA_STRIKE_LIMIT consecutive
+#   cycles are required, separating a legitimate library scan or save burst
+#   from a genuine runaway. Strikes auto-clear when the condition resolves.
+#
+# Suppress Ceiling
+#   Containers listed in WATCHDOG_APPDATA_SIZES are exempt from growth alerts
+#   while under their configured ceiling — prevents known-large stable data
+#   from generating recurring false alarms.
+#
+# Dry Run Support
+#   --dry-run reports every truncation that would occur and performs none.
+#
+# Atomic Baseline Update
+#   The growth baseline is written to a temp file and moved into place, so an
+#   interrupted run cannot leave a half-written baseline that would read as
+#   false growth on the next cycle.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
 # ==============================================================================================
 #

Watchdogs/docker_watchdog.sh

@@ -89,6 +89,17 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Container restarts and daemon service control require root.
+#
+# Docker Enabled Check
+#   Exits cleanly when Docker is disabled in the platform's own settings. A
+#   deliberately disabled Docker service is not a fault and must not be
+#   "healed" by restarting the daemon.
+#
+# Docker Presence Check
+#   Verifies the docker binary exists before the cycle begins.
+#
 # Lock Acquisition
 #   Prevents concurrent execution via acquire_lock(). Safe at array start —
 #   only one watchdog instance runs at a time.
@@ -110,8 +121,11 @@
 #
 # Docker Daemon Health Check
 #   First operation every cycle. Daemon not responding within DOCKER_TIMEOUT →
-#   restart via /etc/rc.d/rc.docker → verify recovery. If still hung: log
-#   critical, skip cycle. stability_watchdog.sh handles further escalation.
+#   restart via platform_restart_service docker → verify recovery. If still hung:
+#   log critical, skip cycle, and set daemon_confirmed_down so
+#   stability_watchdog.sh owns any further escalation. The restart itself is
+#   bounded by a 180 second timeout — a daemon stop can block for 30+ minutes on
+#   a busy host, and the watchdog must not be held hostage to it.
 #
 # RAM Emergency Deferral
 #   Reads RW_STATE_FILE each cycle. If resource_watchdog.sh has set

Watchdogs/resource_watchdog.sh

@@ -42,6 +42,32 @@
 #   Cleared when pressure resolves and containers are restarted.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Graduated Response
+#   Pressure is answered with the smallest effective action first — throttle,
+#   then pause, then stop. Each level is only reached because the level below it
+#   failed to relieve pressure. Nothing jumps straight to stopping containers.
+#
+# Reversibility First
+#   docker pause suspends a container without losing its state and is instantly
+#   reversible, so it is preferred at level 2. docker stop, which discards
+#   in-memory state, is held back to level 3 and applied only to services
+#   explicitly listed as expendable in RW_STOP_CONTAINERS.
+#
+# Hysteresis on Recovery
+#   Restoring requires RW_RECOVER_CYCLES consecutive clear cycles and
+#   de-escalates one level at a time. Recovering instantly on a single good
+#   reading would flap — restore, re-trigger, restore — under sustained load.
+#
+# Cross-Watchdog Coordination
+#   Level 3 publishes mem_shutdown_active=true so docker_watchdog.sh defers its
+#   restart logic. Two watchdogs acting on the same containers with opposite
+#   intent would otherwise fight: one stopping to free RAM, the other restarting
+#   to restore health.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -51,13 +77,45 @@
 # Single Instance Lock
 #   acquire_lock prevents concurrent runs from racing on state file writes.
 #
+# Docker Presence Check
+#   Verifies the docker binary exists before any pressure response — every
+#   level-2 and level-3 action depends on it.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() aliases HOST*_RW_PAUSE_CONTAINERS, HOST*_RW_STOP_CONTAINERS
+#   and the downloader credentials to the correct host's values.
+#
+# State File Verification
+#   Exits if RW_STATE_FILE cannot be created. Without durable state the script
+#   cannot track recovery cycles or know which containers it paused, and would
+#   never restore them.
+#
 # RW_CRITICAL_CONTAINERS
-#   Containers listed here are never paused or stopped regardless of pressure level.
+#   Containers listed here are never paused or stopped regardless of pressure
+#   level. Enforced by is_critical(), which gates both the pause and the stop
+#   path — not just the configuration lists.
 #
 # RW_ENABLED Flag
 #   Set RW_ENABLED=false to disable the entire script without removing it from
 #   the orchestrator schedule.
 #
+# Timeout Protection
+#   All docker commands wrapped in a 15 second timeout. Pressure response runs
+#   during a degraded system, which is exactly when the daemon is most likely
+#   to be slow — a hang here would stall the whole watchdog chain every minute.
+#
+# Downloader Availability Guards
+#   SABnzbd and qBittorrent throttling no-ops when the service is disabled or
+#   its URL/credentials are unset. A missing downloader never blocks the
+#   container-level pressure response.
+#
+# Recovery Hysteresis
+#   Restoration requires RW_RECOVER_CYCLES consecutive clear cycles and
+#   de-escalates one level per cycle, preventing flapping under sustained load.
+#
+# Dry Run Support
+#   --dry-run reports every throttle, pause and stop without performing any.
+#
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
 # ==============================================================================================

Watchdogs/stability_watchdog.sh

@@ -54,6 +54,39 @@
 #   (Container health is owned by docker_watchdog — not checked here.)
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
+# DESIGN PRINCIPLES
+# ==============================================================================================
+#
+# Last Line of Defense
+#   Every other watchdog tries to heal a specific subsystem. This one assumes
+#   those attempts have already failed and holds the only irreversible remedy in
+#   the ecosystem — a reboot. That authority is why nearly every check here is
+#   gated behind strikes, tiers and abort conditions.
+#
+# Evidence Before Reboot
+#   Strikes are the default; bypassing them requires corroboration, not just a
+#   worse number. Tier 2 needs low RAM AND active OOM kills before it acts —
+#   low RAM alone is a reading, low RAM plus processes being killed is a crisis.
+#
+# Unrecoverable Conditions Skip the Queue
+#   Tier 1 conditions share one property: the system cannot heal from them and
+#   waiting makes recovery less likely. A full rootfs or a kernel oops degrades
+#   further every cycle, and strike-counting through it only guarantees the
+#   reboot happens from a worse state.
+#
+# Data Safety Outranks Uptime
+#   Reboots abort while a ZFS pool is unhealthy, parity is running, or the mover
+#   is active. Interrupting those risks the data itself, which no amount of
+#   uptime justifies. Tier 1 is the sole exception — an imminent crash will
+#   interrupt them anyway, less gracefully.
+#
+# Clear Ownership Boundaries
+#   Container health belongs to docker_watchdog.sh and is deliberately not
+#   checked here. The Docker daemon check writes a flag for docker_watchdog
+#   rather than acting on it. Two watchdogs remediating the same subsystem
+#   would race.
+#
+# ==============================================================================================
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
@@ -61,10 +94,61 @@
 #   Reboot and container stop require root.
 #
 # Single Instance Lock
-#   acquire_lock prevents a second watchdog instance from starting.
+#   acquire_lock prevents a second watchdog instance from starting. Two instances
+#   could each count strikes against the same condition and reach the reboot
+#   threshold in half the intended time.
 #
 # State File Verification
 #   All state files verified writable at startup — errors if any cannot be created.
+#   Strike counts and the reboot log live in these files; if they silently failed
+#   to persist, every cycle would look like strike 1 and the reboot rate limit
+#   would never accumulate.
+#
+# Reboot Rate Limiting
+#   No more than SYS_WATCHDOG_REBOOT_LIMIT reboots within
+#   SYS_WATCHDOG_REBOOT_WINDOW_HRS. On hitting the limit the host powers off
+#   instead of rebooting — a fault that survives repeated reboots will not be
+#   fixed by more of them, and a box cycling endlessly is worse than one that
+#   is cleanly down and obviously needs attention.
+#
+# Abort Conditions
+#   Reboots are aborted while a ZFS pool is unhealthy, parity is running, or the
+#   mover is active — each individually toggleable. Interrupting any of these
+#   risks the data itself.
+#
+# Critical Tier Override
+#   Tier 1 conditions bypass both strikes and abort conditions. These are states
+#   the system cannot recover from and which degrade every cycle; waiting only
+#   guarantees the eventual reboot happens from a worse position.
+#
+# Strike Threshold
+#   Tier 3 requires SYS_WATCHDOG_STRIKE_LIMIT consecutive failing cycles. A
+#   single bad sample — a momentary load spike, a transient RAM dip — never
+#   reboots the system.
+#
+# OOM Corroboration
+#   Tier 2 escalation requires low RAM AND active OOM kills in the same cycle.
+#   Low RAM alone stays in the strike system.
+#
+# Ownership Boundary
+#   Container health is not checked here — docker_watchdog.sh owns it. The Docker
+#   daemon check writes daemon_confirmed_down for docker_watchdog rather than
+#   remediating, so the two never act on the same subsystem.
+#
+# Aborted-Reboot Recovery
+#   An EXIT trap is armed the moment containers start being stopped for a reboot
+#   and disarmed only once the reboot is committed. If the script dies anywhere
+#   in between, the trap restarts everything it stopped — the failure mode is a
+#   running system, never a host left with all containers down and no reboot.
+#
+# Sync Before Reboot
+#   sync is issued before both /sbin/poweroff and /sbin/reboot so pending writes
+#   are flushed. Container stop is additionally bounded by a 60 second timeout so
+#   one unresponsive container cannot hold the shutdown sequence open forever.
+#
+# Dry Run Support
+#   --dry-run runs the full detection path and reports the reboot or shutdown
+#   that would occur without issuing either.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
@@ -74,7 +158,7 @@
 #   Full variable listing in master.conf. Key variables:
 #
 #   SYS_WATCHDOG_REBOOT_WINDOW_HRS  — reboot rate limit window (default: 12)
-#   SYS_WATCHDOG_MAX_REBOOTS        — max reboots in window before giving up (default: 3)
+#   SYS_WATCHDOG_REBOOT_LIMIT       — max reboots in window before giving up (default: 3)
 #   SYS_WATCHDOG_STRIKE_LIMIT       — consecutive failures before reboot (default: 2)
 #   SYS_WATCHDOG_OOM_LIMIT          — OOM kills/cycle to trigger URGENT bypass (default: 3)
 #   SYS_WATCHDOG_MEM_SHUTDOWN_EXCLUDED — containers exempt from memory shutdown

Watchdogs/system_watchdog.sh

@@ -35,10 +35,33 @@
 # OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
 # ==============================================================================================
 #
-#   Root check       — child scripts require root
-#   acquire_lock     — prevents concurrent system watchdog runs
-#   detect_hosts()   — MY_ID in notifications and logs
-#   Non-fatal steps  — a failed step is logged; remaining steps still run
+# Root Enforcement
+#   Every child script requires root. Failing here gives one clear error instead
+#   of the same permission failure repeated once per child.
+#
+# Lock Acquisition
+#   acquire_lock() prevents concurrent system watchdog runs. This is called every
+#   cycle by watchdog_orchestrator.sh — a slow child must not cause two chains to
+#   overlap and run the same watchdog twice.
+#
+# Host Detection
+#   detect_hosts() sets MY_ID for notifications and logs.
+#
+# Empty List Guard
+#   Warns and exits if SYSTEM_WATCHDOG_SCRIPTS is unconfigured. An empty list
+#   would otherwise report "0/0 passed" every cycle — indistinguishable from
+#   healthy, while no system monitoring is actually running.
+#
+# Missing Script Tolerance
+#   run_orch_child() records a missing or failing child as a failed step and
+#   continues. One broken watchdog never suppresses the rest of the chain.
+#
+# Non-Fatal Steps
+#   A failed step is logged and surfaces in the summary and notification, but
+#   remaining steps still execute. Partial coverage beats a halted chain.
+#
+# Dry Run Propagation
+#   --dry-run and --log are passed through to every child script.
 #
 # ==============================================================================================
 # CONFIGURATION
@@ -86,6 +109,13 @@ acquire_lock
 
 detect_hosts
 
+# An empty list reports "0/0 passed" every cycle — reads as healthy while nothing is monitored.
+if [[ ${#SYSTEM_WATCHDOG_SCRIPTS[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
+    warn "SYSTEM_WATCHDOG_SCRIPTS is empty — no system watchdogs will run"
+    warn "Check SYSTEM_WATCHDOG_SCRIPTS in master.conf"
+    exit 0
+fi
+
 [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]] && warn "DRY RUN — passing --dry-run to all sub-scripts"
 
 # ==============================================================================================